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Executive Summary 
The 2016 NSF Cybersecurity Summit for Large Facilities and Cyberinfrastructure continued to 
build a trusting, collaborative community working to address core cybersecurity challenges in 
support of NSF science. The 2016 summit built on the success, findings, and lessons learned 
from previous years, and focused on the theme of Strengthening Trustworthy Science. The 
program committee and presentations submitted by community members drove the program. 
A call for participation(CFP) resulted in nineteen (19) proposals including a mix of 9 case study 
and general presentations, 2 panel topics, and 8 training sessions. For the second year in the 
row, the summit received a marked increase in CFP proposals, again exceeding our capacity to 
accommodate.  
The 2016 summit took place in Arlington, VA, August 16th through midday August 18th. On 
August 16th, it offered a full day of training. The second and third days followed were plenary 
sessions designed to address the theme of Strengthening Trustworthy Science in the context of 
cyberinfrastructure projects and Large Facilities.  
One hundred individuals attended the summit, with 45 individuals -- almost one half of all 
registrants -- participating in planning, speaking, providing training, co-authoring a CFP 
submission, and/or leading a lunch table talk. In all, 44 NSF-funded projects, including 14 Large 
Facilities, were represented. Attendee evaluations and feedback were overwhelmingly positive 
and constructive.  
The Summit continued to make progress on recommendations and opportunities defined at the 
2016 Summit. A full list of recommendations and opportunities is in Section 7 of this report, but 
the following are the Priority Recommendations and the progress made at the 2016 Summit: 
Recommendation 1:​ The NSF CI and Large Facility community should develop a broadly 
applicable strategy for information security budgets, including how, why, and where it does 
what it does in terms of spending. 
Progress towards Recommendation 1​: A number of presentations mentioned budgetary issues 
and the following data points were presented: 
● A case study of DOE Science Labs security budgeting showed average security budgets 
lie between 3% to 12% of the IT budget; 
● a Forrester study showing security spending between 1-13% of IT budgets with 5.6% 
being the average​; and 
● the U.S. Antarctic Program information security budget is equal to  12.5% of the total IT 
budget. 
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Recommendation 2:​ The NSF CI and Large Facility community should support research on 
metrics that indicate whether spending on information security is sufficient and appropriately 
balanced with a project’s science mission.  
Progress towards Recommendation 2​: Presentations from LIGO, GENI, and the NSF Polar 
Program discussed metrics subjectively, e.g. ​“LIGO [security] policy is to properly plan and 
implement security in a way that supports the scientific mission in a minimally intrusive manner 
that enables reliable access to data and use of LIGO.” 
Recommendation 3:​ The NSF CI and Large Facility community should develop a common 
understanding among all stakeholders of how accountability, risk responsibility, and risk 
acceptance practices are most efficiently and appropriately distributed among project 
leadership, project personnel, and other stakeholders. 
Progress towards Recommendation 3:​ Presentations from NCAR and LIGO discussed the 
importance of having management assume responsibility for risk acceptance. A presentation 
from GENI described that projects framework for defining and sharing responsibility​. 
Recommendation 4: ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should determine its software 
assurance, quality, and supply chain requirements. 
Progress towards Recommendation 4:​ A presentation from LIGO described software reviews as 
part of its cybersecurity program. 
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1 Background: Evolving Cybersecurity Landscape, and 
Advancing Trustworthy Science 
Cybersecurity is a fast-developing and challenging field for all organizations in our 
contemporary world. The challenge is amplified by the intersection of myriad factors, including 
rapidly changing technology; ever-evolving and diverse threats; lagging workforce 
development; economic challenges; asymmetries in the cost and difficulty of attack and 
defense; and the nascent state of cybersecurity practice in general.  
NSF awardees face distinct questions when initiating information security programs due to their 
projects’ unusual, and often unique, combination of attributes: distributed, collaborative 
organizational structures and relationships with other entities (​e.g.​, campus); unique, costly 
scientific instruments; limited resources, talent availability, and timelines; diversity in 
communities and missions; open, yet irreplaceable scientific data with an unclear threat model; 
and the need for reproducibility and maintaining public trust in their resulting science. 
A number of well-known frameworks for cybersecurity exist, but they continue to evolve and 
none have emerged as a clear best practice. For example, NIST’s ​Framework for Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity  and the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in 1
Cyberspace (NSTIC)  propose important approaches for cybersecurity programs and identity 2
management. However, best practices for the federal government, commercial companies, and 
even research labs and institutions of higher education, do not directly translate to scientific 
communities and computing infrastructure. 
In addition to the cybersecurity efforts and experiences of individual NSF projects, and the 
research advances of the NSF Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace (SaTC) community, NSF has 
funded cybersecurity resources for the NSF community in the form of the extension of CTSC as 
the  NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (CCoE)  and the Bro Center of Expertise . 3 4
Additionally, NSF has funding for applied cybersecurity for science available under the 
Cybersecurity Innovation for Cyberinfrastructure (CICI)  program.  T​hese resources provide 5
focal points for aggregating experiences, and translating the work from the broader world into 
cybersecurity practices effective for NSF scientific computing.  
CTSC, now in its fifth year, reestablished the NSF cybersecurity summits means to reinvigorate 
1 ​http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/  
2 ​http://www.nist.gov/nstic/  
3 ​http://trustedci.org/  
4 ​https://www.bro.org/nsf/  
5 ​http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2015/nsf15549/nsf15549.htm 
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the NSF cybersecurity community and increasing out trust of the science supported by that 
community. Spanning six years from 2004 to 2009 and then reinstated in 2013, the annual NSF 
Cybersecurity Summits serve as a valuable part of the process of securing NSF scientific 
cyberinfrastructure (CI) and increasing our trust in the science it supports by providing a forum 
for education, sharing experiences, and building community. For many attendees, the summits 
are unique opportunities to come together with their colleagues, to benchmark and debate 
cybersecurity best practices, and to receive practical, relevant training.  
The 2016 summit took place Tuesday, August 16th through midday Thursday, August 18th, at 
the Westin Arlington Gateway near NSF. On August 16th, the summit offered a full day of 
training in response the strong training attendance in both 2014 and 2015 and overwhelmingly 
positive feedback. The second and third days followed a workshop format designed to identify 
both the key cybersecurity challenges facing Large Facilities and the most effective responses to 
those challenges. The event brought together leaders in NSF CI and cybersecurity to continue 
the processes initiated in 2013: building a trusting, collaborative community, and seriously 
addressing that community’s core cybersecurity challenges. 
The remainder of this report outlines the summit’s organizational process, the resultant 
program, details on attendance and participation, and results of attendees’ evaluations of the 
event. The report concludes with Recommendations and closing thoughts of the organizers. 
2 The Summit’s Purpose, Scope, and Theme 
The 2016 summit built on the Recommendations of the 2015 summit , which was well received 6
both as an educational opportunity and a community networking event. We organizers believe 
the summits can go even further, and support measurable progress on the following goals: 
identifying, establishing and sharing community standards for best practices regarding 
cybersecurity; providing pragmatic levels of information security; meaningfully addressing 
software assurance, quality  or supply chains in the context of the project cybersecurity 
programs; and supporting scientific discovery.  
The recommendations of the 2015 summit served as drivers for the 2016 event: 
2015 Recommendation 1​. ​​​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should 
develop a broadly applicable strategy for information security budgets, including 
how, why, and where it does what it does in terms of spending. 
2015 Recommendation 2​. ​​​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should 
6 See the 2015 summit report, agenda, and more at ​http://trustedci.org/2015summit/ 
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support research on metrics that indicate whether spending on information 
security is sufficient and appropriately balanced with a project’s science mission. 
2015 Recommendation 3​. ​​​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should 
develop a common understanding among all stakeholders of how accountability, 
risk responsibility, and risk acceptance practices are most efficiently and 
appropriately distributed among project leadership, project personnel, and other 
stakeholders. 
2015 Recommendation 4​. ​​​ ​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should 
determine its software assurance, quality, and supply chain requirements. 
The 2015 event focused on Information assets that enable science which entail the production, 
maintenance, and use of valuable (and sometimes one-of-a-kind) information systems and 
data.  
For 2016, we determined to focus efforts around the theme, ​Strengthening Trustworthy 
Science​, ​to highlight the 2015 recommendations on software assurance, risk 
responsibility/acceptance, security budgeting and program metrics. 
3 The Organizing and Program Committees 
The 2016 summit was organized and hosted by ​the NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence​, and 
six members of that project (Ryan Kiser, Jim Marsteller, Susan Sons, Jim Basney, Amy Starzynski 
Coddens, Von Welch) along with Leslee Cooper, the Administrative Director for the IU Center 
for Applied Cybersecurity Research, served as the organizing committee. We recruited a 
Program Committee (PC) made up of key leaders from NSF CI projects and the broader 
community. The PC was to be responsible for setting the agenda and inviting speakers, 
evaluating and selecting from among proposed training, talks and panels, extending invitations 
to expert presenters, participating actively in the event itself, and laying the framework for 
successful post-summit evaluation and community support. Jim Marsteller served as chair of 
the PC, a role he has held in prior summits. The PC held 17 meetings by conference call 
beginning February 23, 2016 and ending August 23, 2016. It conferred electronically both prior 
to and following this time period, with monthly meetings.  
The 2016 PC members were: 
● Steve Barnet, ​Senior System Administrator for the IceCube Neutrino Observatory.  
● Anthony (Tony) Baylis​, Assistant Department Manager for the Computing Applications 
and Research Department in the Computation Directorate at Lawrence Livermore 
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National Laboratory. 
● Michael Corn​, Deputy CIO and CISO for Brandeis University. 
● Barbara Fossum​, NEES deputy center director and former managing director of Purdue 
University’s Cyber Center and Computer Research Institute. 
● Ardoth Hassler​, Associate Vice President of University Information Services & Executive 
Director, Office of Assessment and Decision Support at Georgetown University and 
former Senior Information Technology Advisor in the Office of the Chief Information 
Officer in the NSF Office of Information and Resource Management, Division of 
Information Systems. 
● Susan Ramsey​, Risk Assessor and Security Engineer at the National Center for 
Atmospheric Research.  
● George Strawn​, NAS as board director for the Board on Research Data and Information, 
Formerly NSFnet program director and then division director of networking), then CISE 
executive officer and acting assistant director, and then served as CIO. He was detailed 
to OSTP in 2009 where he served as director of the NITRD NCO . 
4 The Call for Participation and Program 
The full agenda and biographies are attached to this report as Appendices A and B . 7
The PC issued a call for participation (CFP) to the community requesting submissions in the 
form of: (a) white papers one to five pages in length, focused on unmet cybersecurity 
challenges, lessons learned, and/or significant successes,  (b) one to two-page abstracts for 
proposed half and full-day trainings, (c) one to two page abstracts for proposed table talk 
sessions, or (d) student applications.  Additionally, the PC invited specific community leaders as 8
well as experts from outside the community to give presentations and participate in panels.  
The CFP continued a process started in 2014, designed to elicit a greater degree of community 
participation in developing the agenda, executing the summit, and increasing our ability to 
identify summit findings that represent the concerns, successes, and aspirations of our 
community. The 2014 CFP process was expanded in 2015 and 2016, and a “Tips for Building CFP 
Responses” was provided to guide and encourage respondents and additional content formats 
7 The full summit program is also available on the CTSC website, 
http://trustedci.org/s/ProgramAgenda-2016Summit-SourceDocument.pdf  
8 ​http://trustedci.org/2016-nsf-cfp/​; see also Appendix C. 
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were considered. All submitted white papers are collected in Appendix D. The CFP process 
proved a success, and drove a great deal of the resultant program, including a mix of 9 case 
study and general presentations, 2 panel topics, and 8 training sessions, as well as a keynote 
from the cybersecurity community at large, and presentations from key leaders from within the 
NSF community.​ ​For the second year in the row, we received a marked increase in CPF 
proposals, again exceeding our capacity to accommodate.  
The Summit program spanned two and a half days from August 16 through 18. On August 16th, 
we offered a full day of training. Descriptions of each training session are appended as 
Appendix E.  On August 17th and 18th, the Summit followed a plenary format with talks invited 9
by the program committee and accepted from the CFP responses. Dr. Irene Qualters, Division 
Director of NSF/ACI welcomed the attendees and Peter Kuper of In-Q-Tel gave an invited 
keynote. The program of submitted talks then commenced with talks on the NSF Cybersecurity 
Center of Excellence, and lessons learned at Gemini, LIGO, and TACC. Talks then followed on 
the topics of Science DMZ as a Security Architecture, Cybersecurity Budgeting, and Provenance 
Based Security. The first day then concluded with talks on the topic of identity management 
from FermiLab and the Globus Project, and an open discussion session. 
Day two opened with a retrospective on FBI Major Case 216 (aka the “Stakkato Incident”) that 
spurred the original launch of the Summit in 2004.  Presentations then continued with a 
overview of GENI cybersecurity, and presentations on adapting the NIST Risk Management 
Framework to the NSF Cooperative Agreement for Large Facilities, and a panel on compliance 
(FISMA, FERPA, and HIPAA). Another open discussion session concluded the summit. 
5 Participants 
For the first time in the summit’s history, we opened registration to all interested individuals. 
This was done to avoid being insular, maintain and develop new relationships, and encourage 
infusion of additional perspectives. Registration was granted to all parties who requested 
attend and were able to demonstrate a connection to the community. As with prior summits, 
registration was free, and, as in previous years, invitations were sent to a predetermined list of 
individuals. Our invitation list was based on the invitation list from the 2015 summit, and was 
updated to account for changes in the community, suggestions from NSF staff, and speakers to 
address specific topics of the summit. The invitation list included those with direct 
cybersecurity responsibilities in NSF Large Facilities and CI projects, NSF project principal 
investigators, and other key stakeholders and risk owners to ensure that NSF cybersecurity 
9 ​See also, ​http://trustedci.org/2015training/ 
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evolves to address their needs.  
 
One hundred forty two (142) individuals requested registration for the summit, 121 registered, 
and 100 attended (including speakers, tutorial presenters, panelists, students and the program 
committee). A listing of the attendees and their affiliations is in Appendix G. Seventy one 
attendees participated in the August 16 training sessions.​ ​Forty five individuals - almost one half 
of participants - participated in planning, spoke, provided training, co-authored a CFP 
submission, and/or led a lunch table talk. Five attendees were students.  Twenty four attendees 
work at Large Facilities. Twelve attendees work at the NSF. 
5.1 NSF Project Representation 
Attendees were asked to provide the NSF project or other organization (NSF directorate in the 
case of NSF staff) with which they were associated. The following list contains the provided 
answers. We count 44 projects including 14 Large Facilities (marked with “♦”), were 
represented at the summit by representatives of those projects. Additionally, eight more Large 
Facilities were represented by NSF program officers (marked with “♦*”). NSF directorates 
represented by program officers only are marked with “*”. NSF directorates represented in 
some manner include: CISE/ACI, CISE/CNS, ENG/CMMI, GEO/AGS, GEO/EAR, GEO/OCE, 
GEO/PLR, GEO/PLR, MPS/AST, MPS/DMR, and MPS/PHY. Additionally NIH/NIGMS and 
DOE/ESnet were represented. 
We note some answers given represent NSF projects (e.g. “CC*IIE”) or other general areas of 
the NSF community (e.g. “Science Gateways”) which are not very precise and we will work on 
obtaining more precise specification of awards in future summits to improve our understanding 
of community representation. 
● Atacama Large Millimeter Array (ALMA) ♦ 
● Advanced Modular Incoherent Scatter Radar (AMISR) 
● Arecibo Observatory (AO) ♦* 
● A Toroidal LHC Apparatus (ATLAS) ♦* Detector 
● Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy, Inc. (AURA)  
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● Building Community and Capacity in Data Intensive Research in Education (BCC) 
● Blue Waters 
● Bro Center of Expertise 
● CC*DNI/CC-NIE  
● CC*IIE  
● Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC) 
● CILogon 
● Cornell High Energy Synchrotron Source (CHESS) ♦ 
● Compact Muon Solenoid Detector (CMS)♦* 
● Cybercorps: Scholarship for Service 
● Cyber-Enabled Discovery and Innovation (CDI) 
● Cyber-Enabled Materials, Manufacturing, and Smart Systems (CEMMSS) 
● Cyber-Physical Systems 
● Cybersecurity Innovation for Cyberinfrastructure 
● Data Infrastructure Building Blocks (DIBBs) 
● Dark Energy Camera (DECam) 
● Daniel K. Inouye Solar Telescope (DKIST) ♦ 
● EarthCube (EAGER) 
● Extreme Science and Engineering Discovery Environment (XSEDE) 
● Faculty Early Career Development (CAREER) 
● Geodesy Advancing Geosciences and Earthscope (GAGE) ♦* 
● Green Bank Telescope (GBT) 
● Gemini Observatory ♦ 
● GENI Engineering Conference 
● Historically Black Colleges and Universities Undergraduate Program (HBCU-UP) 
● HTCondor 
● IceCube South Pole Neutrino Observatory (IceCube) ♦ 
● International Ocean Discovery Program (IODP) ♦ 
● Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) ♦ 
● Large Synoptic Survey Telescope (LSST) ♦ 
● Major Research Instrumentation Program (MRI)  
● National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) ♦ 
● National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) 
● National High Magnetic Field Laboratory (NHMFL) ♦ 
● National Optical Astronomy Observatory (NOAO) ♦ 
● National Radio Astronomy Observatory (NRAO) ♦ 
● National Solar Observatory (NSO) ♦ 
● Natural Hazards Engineering Research Infrastructure (NHERI) ♦ 
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● Ocean Observatories Initiative (OOI) ♦* 
● Open Science Cyberthreat Profile Working Group 
● Open Science Grid (OSG) 
● Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center (PSC) 
● Rapid Response Research (RAPID) 
● Summer of Applied Geophysical Experience (SAGE) ♦* 
● Science Gateways 
● SciDaaS 
● Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace 
● Small Business Technology Transfer Program (STTR) 
● Stampede (TACC) 
● SURE: Summer Undergraduate Research in Engineering/Science 
● Sustain-GT 
● US Antarctic Program ♦* 
● University-National Oceanographic Laboratory System (UNOLS)* 
● Very Large Array (VLA) ♦ 
● Very Long Baseline Array (VLBA) 
Participation from NSF program officers at the Cybersecurity Summit was lower this year than 
in previous years, with 12 attendees as opposed to the 18 that attended in 2015. We note next 
year NSF will be in process of moving from Arlington to Alexandria, which could also impact 
attendance in 2017. We are considering these facts at this time and have no definite plan to 
react. 
5.2 Student Representation 
In addition to professionals, the Summit supported the participation of five students. Students 
were encouraged to self-nominate to the program, but were also able to be nominated by a 
mentor or teacher. In order to be further considered, they were then asked to provide a 
one-page, 800-word maximum letter describing the student’s interest in and any relevant 
experience with cybersecurity, emphasizing the benefit to the student and/or community of the 
student’s attendance at the Cybersecurity Summit.  
The Program Committee reviewed all 10 submissions with an interest in advancing diversity and 
inclusiveness, settling on the following exceptional five students: Deja T. Jackson (Kennesaw 
State University), Dominique Dalanni (California State University, Dominguez Hills), Nikita 
Golubets (Eastern Michigan University), Rasib Khan (University of Alabama at Birmingham), and 
Vitaly Ford (Tennessee Tech University).  
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The selected student applicants were paired with mentors from the program committee and 
community to encourage their continued participation in cybersecurity and NSF 
cyberinfrastructure. Students and mentors were given one another’s contact information prior 
to the summit and encouraged, but not required, to contact one another. However, each pair 
did communicate prior to the summit, allowing them to familiarize themselves with one 
another prior to meeting in person. Once at the summit, 
students and mentors met each day for breakfast and lunch, 
along with one night for the program committee dinner. These 
meet-ups allowed the students to ask any questions they may 
have and assist in networking, while allowing mentors to 
introduce and share the community with potential new 
members.  
This program has shown success, and we have received positive 
feedback from both students and mentors. One student in 
particular stated after this summit: 
“I had such an amazing time at the conference and I just wanted 
to thank you all for being so welcoming.  I learned so much and 
gained exposure to so many different topics that I didn't even 
know existed. I truly had a wonderful  experience so thank you 
and it was lovely meeting you all.”​ (Dominique Dalanni, California 
State University, Dominguez Hills).  
5.3 Inclusiveness  
Finding 4 from the 2013 summit stated “Future program committees should take on gender, 
age, and racial/ethnic diversity in the community and summit attendance as a strategic 
imperative for future summits.”  The organizers recognize that diverse participation is both a 
socially relevant outcome for NSF  and a particular challenge in the cybersecurity community in 10
general . Thus, in 2014, we expressly addressed the topic with the PC, identifying two 11
members to spearhead efforts (Baylis, Hassler), and the group sought to encourage diverse 
participation via the invitees, speakers, panelists, and PC itself. Additionally, the CFP expressly 
gave priority to those students from groups underrepresented in the NSF information security 
workforce. We note that Baylis has specific experience in this area as chair of the 
10 ​See​, NSF GPG, Section II.C.2.d.i 
11 ​See, e.g.​, ​Agents of Change: Women in the Information Security Profession.​ A whitepaper derived from the 2013 
(ISC)2 Global Information Security Workforce Study. Available from: 
https://www.isc2cares.org/uploadedFiles/wwwisc2caresorg/Content/Women-in-the-Information-Security-Professi
on-GISWS-Subreport.pdf  
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Supercomputing Broader Engagement in 2008 and participated in that committee in 2009. 
Baylis and Hassler again spearheaded these efforts in 2016, building on the success seen in 
2014 and 2015.  
In order to gather ongoing baseline data related to this diversity effort, 2016 registrants had the 
option to provide their ethnicity/race and gender/sex. There was a small decrease in the 
number of female registrants in 2016, and a slight change in the ethnicity/race of registrants, 
with an increase in diverse participants. The aggregated responses to the those items follow. 
Voluntary responses to these questions show: 
Table 1. Attendee self-reported ethnicity. 
Ethnicity / Race  
Asian or Southeast Asian 8 
Black or African American 3 
Hispanic or Latino 3 
Native Alaskan or American Indian 0 
Multiracial 0 
White or Caucasian 60 
Other Ethnicity 0 
Other (space provided) 0 
Prefer not to answer 5 
No Answer Provided 21 
 
Table 2. Attendee self-reported gender. 
Gender / Sex  
Female 16 
Male 59 
No Answer Provided 25 
 
6 Attendee Evaluations 
We sought attendee evaluations of the summit via two SurveyMonkey surveys. One survey 
gathered feedback on the summit generally; the other requested feedback specific to the 
August 16 training sessions. 
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6.1 Attendee Survey 
A summary of the general survey results is appended to this report as Appendix H. The 
responses were generally very positive and extremely thoughtful, with responses to Question 
#13, “How can we improve the summit  experience in the future?,” seeing attendees requesting 
slight logistical changes and requesting that CTSC continue what they are doing with some 
adjustments. One attendee captured this theme with the response ​“Identify a common theme 
(or multiple common themes) that can be addressed and presented throughout the summit. This 
year, for example, there were multiple references to keeping upper management involved in 
cybersecurity. There were several interesting ideas on how to best approach this, others 
addressing the reasons to do this, however, it seemed as though this was simply a conclusion 
that each center has come to during the life of their cybersecurity projects. Maybe a community 
poll to identify issues that each center is struggling with will identify these common themes that 
can be discussed and shared at the summit.”​ Another attendee stated ​“Is it feasible to tack on 
some extra time, for example having it end in the afternoon rather than at 12/12:30? Might 
give us time for one or two expanded sessions, and/or more time for freeform discussions 
between attendees (“networking”).”​ The program committee has taken this feedback into 
consideration and will continue to consider it during the planning of the 2017 summit.  
A summary of the additional survey responses follows. 
Forty-two attendees (approximately 42% of all attendees) responded to the general “Attendee 
Survey.” The organizers did not submit responses, but the survey was open to all other 
participants. We did not request the names of respondents, and have redacted some 
information from the appended report to further protect the anonymity of respondents.  
The quantified and categorical results (​e.g.​, rating scales, yes/no questions) were very 
favorable. Selections follow:  
● To Question #5, “How would you rate your overall experience with the 2016 summit?,” 
98% of respondents selected “Good” or “Excellent.” 
● Regarding Question #7, “Was this summit better than what you expected, worse than 
what you expected, or about what you expected?,” the summit at least met the 
expectations of 95% of respondents, exceeding the expectations of 60% of respondents.  
● To Question #8, “How useful to your work was the information discussed at the 
summit?” 100% of respondents gave ratings of “moderately useful,” “very useful,” or 
“extremely useful,” with 81% providing the higher two responses. 
● To Question #9, “If you attended last year’s summit, how does this year’s compare?” 
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55% of respondents gave ratings of “this year’s summit was about the same as last 
year’s,” “this year’s summit was better than last year’s,” or “this year’s summit was 
much better than last year’s,” with 32.5% providing the higher two responses. 42.5% of 
respondents indicated that they did not attend last year’s summit.  
● To Question #11, “Would you like to attend future summits?” 92.86% responded “Yes,” 
with 4.76% responding “Maybe.” Just one person, accounting for 2.38%, responded that 
they would not like to attend future summits.  
Questions 13 and 14 sought open-ended responses, and were designed to elicit critique and 
discern highly-valued aspects of the experience. While the generally positive results of the 
above-referenced questions provide context, these open-ended questions have proved a useful 
communication tool. Observations follow: 
● Question 13 asked, “How can we improve the summit experience in the future?” Of the 
25 respondents to this question, 10 suggested some adjustments that would build on 
the current programming. An example response follows: 
“1. Hear more from students (poster sessions, lightening rounds, etc.) - this could 
be during coffee breaks. 2. Possibly make connections with students about 
summer REUs - this could be part of networking socials. 3. As a social scientist, I 
learned a lot about the infrastructure that’s available for NSF research. However, 
I didn’t have enough time to grasp everything. Perhaps a month before next 
year’s summit, would it be possible to ask researchers to submit their current 
research projects (abstract) along with their corresponding infrastructure needs? 
And then ask infrastructure providers (ex. GENI, etc.) to see if there’s any services 
that might be available to the researchers. Then, during the summit, pair up 
researchers with potential providers for 20 minutes. The researchers would 
(ideally) leave with specs sheets for provider services costs, logistics details, and 
cybersecurity considerations.” 
● Question 14 asked, “Were there any aspects of the summit you found particularly useful 
or important? If so, please explain.” 
○ Of the 26 respondents, 8 praised the plenary discussions and 8 highlighted the 
training sessions as particularly useful or important​. 
○ Nine (9) respondents highlighted networking opportunities.  
An example response follows: ​“The chance for members to present their solutions, and 
the candid discussion of the subject matter as well as the transparency in discussion and 
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equal participation. This is really a community, rather than a canned presentation, and 
because of this, it’s a unique conference.” 
6.2 Training Evaluation 
The Training Day preceding this year’s summit offered eight training sessions: 2 all day sessions, 
and 6 half day sessions. Each session was well attended, with topics and number of attendees 
as follows: Log Analysis Training with CTSC and Bro AM (14); Federated Identity Management 
for Research Organizations AM (6); REN-ISAC Cyberthreat Training (30 MinuteIntro) /
Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Projects (15); Building a NIST Risk Management 
Framework for HIPAA and FISMA Compliance (9); Secure Coding Practices and Automated 
Assessment Tools (7); Log Analysis Training with CTSC and Bro PM (11); Federated Identity 
Management for Research Organizations PM (7); Securing Legacy Industrial Control Systems 
(14); Building the Modern Research Data Portal Using the Globus Platform (8); and Secure 
Software Engineering Best Practices (14). Each tutorial attendee was asked to fill out a 
tutorial-specific survey after each training session concluded. 
The responses to the tutorial-specific surveys were very positive generally, and included 
constructive feedback, as well as ideas for future training offerings. For simplicity, we asked 
attendees to complete one survey with several repeated questions to allow sorting 
differentiated responses for morning and afternoon sessions. The aggregated ratings in 
Questions 1 through 10, and 13 through 18 are attached as Appendix I. We summarize a few 
aggregate responses below: 
● To Question 3, “Based on your overall experience with the August 16 training sessions, 
would you participate in training offered at future summits?,” 22 (​i.e.​, 92%) of 24 
respondents selected “Yes,” 2 selected “Maybe,” and 0 selected “No.” 
● To Questions 7 and 15, “How would you rate your overall experience with the 
[morning/afternoon] training?,” 91% of responses were “Excellent” or “Good.” 
● To Questions 9 and 17, “Was this [morning/afternoon] training better than what you 
expected, worse than what you expected, or about what you expected?,” 93% of 
responses indicated that expectations were met or exceeded. Forty-seven (47%) of 
responses were “Quite a bit better” or “A great deal better.”  
● To Questions 10 and 18, “How useful to your work was this [morning/afternoon] 
training?,” 71% of responses were “Very Useful” or “Extremely Useful.” 
The responses for the individual tutorials were reported back to their respective tutorial 
leaders, including responses to Questions 11 and 19, “How can we improve this training session 
in the future?” and Questions 12 and 20, “Were there any aspects of [morning/afternoon] 
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training you found particularly useful or important? Please explain.” 
7  Progress Towards Priority Recommendations 
The 2015 Summit defined a number of Priority Recommendations, Recommendations for 
Continued Action, and Opportunities and Recommendations for Exploration for future 
Summits. In this section we revisit those recommendations and discuss contributions to each 
made at the 2016 Summit. 
7.1  Priority Recommendations 
The following were identified by the 2015 summit as areas in need of focused attention.  
7.1.1  Information Security Budgets 
Recommendation 1:​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should develop a broadly 
applicable strategy for information security budgets, including how, why, and where it 
does what it does in terms of spending. 
Discussion​: 
In 2015 budgets for information security emerged as a major theme and major question. This 
year a number of sessions touched upon funding information security efforts. Craig Jackson, 
Bob Cowles (CTSC) and Scott Russell (CACR), delivered a session specifically  focused on security 
budgeting. Their research included the results of reviewing recent Cybersecurity spending 
surveys followed by a case study of DOE Science Labs security budgeting. Their research 
showed average security budgets lie between 3% to 12% of the IT budget. For our community 
they recommend engaging peer organizations to compare budgeting strategies.  They also 
encouraged participation in the ​2016 NSF Community Cybersecurity Benchmarking Survey​ as a 
way for the CI community to aggregate information on the state​ of cybersecurity for NSF 
projects and facilities. 
Other observations on security budgeting from the plenary: 
● The keynote speaker, Peter Kuper from IQT presented a state of surging costs to secure 
assets despite a downward trend on return on investments -​ ​"We are not winning the 
war"​. He suggest that organizations consider outsourcing services to commercial 
companies that have deep investments in their security operations.  
● Chris Morrison (Gemini) & Tim Minick (HPM) cited a Forrester study showing security 
spending between 1-13% of IT budgets with 5.6% being the average. 
● Irene Qualters (NSF) notes need for expert staff. A number of speakers commented that 
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attracting and retaining talent is challenging in the information security field. 
● Abe Singer (NERSC)  notes ​“blocking ports and changing passwords costs time/money” 
● Tim Howard (NSF) shared the U.S. Antarctic Program information security budget is 
equal to  12.5% of the total IT budget. 
There was a measurable increased interest in exploring funding security programs in 2016 that 
will continue in the coming years. The results of the community benchmarking survey could 
provide an interesting insights in 2017. 
Recommendation 2​: The NSF CI and Large Facility community should support research 
on metrics that indicate whether spending on information security is sufficient and 
appropriately balanced with a project’s science mission.  
Discussion​: 
Several presentations discussed metrics for a cybersecurity program. Abe Singer’s presentation 
on LIGO security qualitatively captured a cybersecurity goal well in the context of NSF science: 
“LIGO [security] policy is to properly plan and implement security in a way that supports the 
scientific mission in a minimally intrusive manner that enables reliable access to data and use of 
LIGO.”  
Other observations: 
● Vic Thomas framed the goal of GENI cybersecurity in a manner that implied metrics: 
“GENI seeks to build a trusted environment in which experimenters and resource owners 
can participate in resource allocation.”​ and ​“These trust relationships reflect 
human/interorganizational relationships, nothing more.” 
● Susan Ramsey of NCAR discussed the problem of too much policy resulting from a 
cybersecurity process being counterproductive. 
● Warren Raquel of NCSA described the value of metrics as useful in justifying 
cybersecurity programs to management and identifying gaps. 
● Tim Howard of the NSF Polar Program noted the need to ​“Continually evaluate IT 
investment to balance security investments against operational investments”​ with the 
context that our goal is to ​“do science, securely.” 
●  Michael Sinatra’s presentation on Science DMZs stressed the need for risk-based 
security and the goal of transmitting science data. 
Taken together, these observations reflect a growing consensus that cybersecurity exists to 
produce more secure science and that metrics for cybersecurity in the context of open science 
should include the impact on science (the smaller the impact the better).   
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7.1.2  Accountability, Risk Acceptance, and the Role of Project Leadership 
Recommendation 3​:  The NSF CI and Large Facility community should develop a 
common understanding among all stakeholders of how accountability, risk 
responsibility, and risk acceptance practices are most efficiently and appropriately 
distributed among project leadership, project personnel, and other stakeholders. 
Discussion​: 
The role of project leadership continued as a theme across many plenary sessions. Susan 
Ramsey (NCAR) discussed the importance of getting executive sponsorship when 
developing/maturing an information security program. This includes having the 
executive/senior project management involved in the risk management process along with 
signatory acceptance of the audit findings and other official documents.  
Additional discussions on risk responsibility and accountability from the plenary: 
● Abe Singer (former LIGO CISO) discussed LIGO’s security program that includes a team 
of stakeholders that identify risks and mitigation controls along with residual risk. A 
report containing this information is presented to the Directorate management for 
official sign-off. 
● Vicraj Thomas described how security responsibilities are shared among the GENI 
federation. GENI uses a number of Federation agreements to outline responsibilities 
including those of Aggregate providers, Clearinghouse providers, and an acceptable use 
policy. 
7.1.3  Requirements for Software Assurance, Quality, and Supply Chain 
Recommendation 4: ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should determine its 
software assurance, quality, and supply chain requirements. 
Discussion​: 
Software assurance was a point of emphasis in 2015, with featured talks by Dave Nalley, ​The 
Tragedy of Open Source,​ and Amar Takhar, ​Risks of Infrastructure Neglect and the Road Ahead​, 
focusing a detailed discussion on challenges to open source software maintenance as they 
pertain to security. In 2016, we noted software reviews are part of LIGO’s cybersecurity 
program (as reported in Abe Singer’s talk), and the software security training continues to be 
well-attended, but there was not otherwise a strong response to this topic from the 
community. 
It is the observation of the organizers that this topic is not one that many operational 
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cybersecurity people feel expert in and it has a steep learning curve, which makes it challenging 
to incorporate into cybersecurity programs and hence may reflect its lack of representation in 
presentations. Requests to CTSC for engagements focusing on software security would seem to 
support this. With the recently funded NSF Software Institutes, we suggest engagement and 
coordination with NSF projects to determine their goals regarding software security may yield 
some unmet requirements in this space. 
7.2  Recommendations for Continued Action 
The 2015 summit report highlighted a handful of areas for continued work. These are areas 
where there is evidence that progress is being made, but must continue. These not as urgent as 
the recommendations in Section 7.1, and were not a focus of the 2016 summit, but we note 
any related discussion. 
7.2.1  Baseline Expectations 
Recommendation 5​: ​Utilizing a consensus process that includes all stakeholders, the 
NSF CI and Large Facility community should adopt a common, broadly applicable 
framework for information security. 
Discussion​: 
The 2016 summit included a presentation from Tim Howard of NSF’s Division of Polar Programs 
on “Strengthening Trustworthy Science: Ideas for Adapting the NIST Risk Management 
Framework to the NSF Cooperative Agreement for Large Facilities.” This presentation discussed 
the use of project-based risk management to cybersecurity with the observation “We are 
already doing the Risk Management Framework, might as well claim credit for it.“ and suggests 
“If we as the cybersecurity expertise for cyberinfrastructure evaluate the NIST Risk 
Management Framework more thoroughly, we can define standard approaches for adapting 
the RMF to unique science mission programs.” 
7.2.2  Risk-Based Approaches 
Recommendation 6: ​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should continue to 
implement, refine, and evaluate risk-based approaches to cybersecurity that leverage 
established best practices as much as possible, while also addressing the community’s 
particular needs around unique scientific instruments, data, openness, 
multi-organizational relationships, mission assurance, resilience, and project lifespans. 
Discussion​: 
The presentations from LIGO, TACC, Gemini, GENI all highlight individual approaches to 
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cybersecurity and include risk-based approaches. The presentation on Science DMZs highlight 
them as a risk-based approach to enabling scientific data transfer through network 
segmentation. 
The discussion of metrics (see Section 7.1.1) highlights many of the community's particular 
needs around unique science assets as does the Open Science Cyber Threat (Risk) Profile 
discussed in the Cybersecurity Center of Excellence update. 
7.2.3  Community Building & Information Sharing 
Recommendation 7: ​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should find more ongoing 
ways of collaboratively developing and maintaining cybersecurity programs, such as 
sharing materials, services, practices, lessons learned, and collaborative/peer reviews.  
Discussion​: 
This summit continued a dramatic increase in the open discussion of projects’ and facilities’ 
specific information security practices and lessons learned, with CFP responses driving the 
majority of the agenda. There was some discussion on how we could foster increased sharing of 
incidents and “lessons learned” in addition to success stories and the organizers agree that 
continuing to work on social factors to increases attendee’s comfort level with share should 
continue to be a focus. 
7.2.4  Identity and Access Management 
Recommendation 8:​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should continue to 
develop and disseminate best practices for identity and access management to support 
research. 
Discussion​: 
In addition to a repeat of the “Federated Identity Management for Research Organizations” 
training, there was a presentation from FermiLab on “Computing Grid Access with Federated 
Identity” at the 2016 summit. This presentation provided an update on identity management in 
the Open Science Grid and its use of CILogon. 
7.3  Opportunities for Exploration 
The 2015 summit identified areas of opportunity, which the community may want to 
exploration to identify the magnitude or benefit or risk associated with each area. As with the 
prior Recommendations for Continued Action, these were not a focus of the 2016 summit nor 
are they considered to critical areas in need of immediate attention. We include them in the 
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report to note note any related discussion. Some current opportunities may evolve to become 
future community recommendations if interest increases. 
 
7.3.1 NSF-Funding Facilities and Projects as Real-World Cybersecurity Research 
Environments 
Opportunity 1 : ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should explore how it can 12
support, participate in, and directly benefit from basic and applied cybersecurity 
research like that funded via NSF’s Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace (SaTC) and Risk 
and Resilience solicitations. 
Discussion​: 
As a result of the call for participation, Dr. Ragib Hasan presented on “Provenance Based 
Security” research at the 2016 summit. Additionally, several project presentations, notably 
GENI and OSG, described security architectures which could be described as applied research. 
In particular Vic Thomas described how GENI is used for research and education in 
cybersecurity topics such as: DDoS mitigation using SDN; OpenFlow based firewalls and NATs; 
Man-in-the-middle attacks; and ToR networks. 
7.3.2 Community Threat Model  
Opportunity 2 : ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should closely follow, 13
participate in, evaluate, and validate the NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence’s 
community threat model development effort, including determining whether insights 
into threat actors and threat events positively impact the efficiency and effectiveness of 
our cybersecurity programs and risk management processes. 
Discussion​: 
As highlighted in Welch’s talk on the activities by the Cybersecurity Center of Excellence, it has 
collaborated with ESnet to assemble a working group to develop a Risk Profile which describes 
common scientific assets and how they can be impacted by threats. Subsequent to the summit, 
the working group has released the initial version of this profile at ​http://trustedci.org/oscrp/​. 
7.3.3 Real Time Data, Threat Intelligence, and Information Sharing Services 
12 Previously Recommendation 10 in 2015 
13 Previously Recommendation 11 in 2015 
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Opportunity 3 :​ The NSF CI and Large Facility community should explore collaboration 14
with, and even drive change in, existing cross-organizational mechanisms (​e.g.​, 
REN-ISAC, EDUCAUSE, Internet2) where information sharing can efficiently and 
effectively help the community gain a defensive advantage. 
Discussion​: 
The presentation on the Cybersecurity Center of Excellence described its new situational 
awareness service (​http://trustedci.org/situational-awareness/​). 
7.3.4  Privacy 
Opportunity 4 :​ The NSF CI and Large Facility community should determine when and 15
how privacy intersects with NSF CI cybersecurity efforts in terms of (i) legal and 
regulatory requirements; (ii) our community’s norms, values, and stakeholder 
relationships; and (iii) being a barrier to and/or enabler of science. 
Discussion​: 
Tim Howard’s presentation noted requirements for privacy based on FISMA, OMB Circular 
A-130, and NSF’s Proposal and Award Policies and Procedures Guide (PAPPG) guidance on Data 
Management Plans. 
This report shifts Privacy from a Recommendation of Continued Action, where it was listed in 
2015, to a Opportunity for Exploration due to a perceived lack of ongoing effort in this area. 
8 Closing Thoughts from the Organizers 
We continue to be extremely happy with the impact the summit is having in terms of bringing 
the community together, soliciting responses to the call for participation, and fostering sharing 
experiences amongst the community. We thank the community members who enable this 
success through their participation at the summit. In particular we thank those who serve on 
the program committee.  We’re excited to see a second year of growth in community 
participation and response to the call for proposals, again exceeding the program’s capacity to 
accommodate. 
We do believe however that we, the program committee, and the community should not 
become complacent. With our established trust and sense of community, we should consider 
and continue to refine our ongoing and long-term goals to ensure we continue our current 
14 Previously Recommendation 12 in 2015 
15 Previously Recommendation 9 in 2015 
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successes and continue to produce new successes as well as adapt to changes in the 
cybersecurity and NSF landscapes. We will continue to evolve the summit to adjust to meet the 
community's changing needs. 
We will continue to adjust our registration scheme to obtain fair participation by the NSF and 
broader communities - e.g. modeling what we have seen at other NSF PI meetings, we are 
considering allowing each NSF project to have two free attendees and charge for additional 
attendees or those not from an NSF project or with an invitation from the organizers. 
Finally, we thank the program committee members for their hard work and devotion to the 
summit, and we thank NSF for funding the summits and providing presentations. 
-2016 Summit Organizers: Jim Basney, Ryan Kiser, Jim Marsteller, Susan Sons, Amy 
Starzynski Coddens, and Von Welch. 
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Appendix A 
The Agenda 
1	  
Program	  Agenda2016	  NSF	  Cybersecurity	  Summit	  for	  Large	  Facilities	  and	  CyberinfrastructureAugust	  16	  -­‐	  August	  18	  	  	  	  	  Westin	  Arlington	  Gateway	  	  	  	  	  Arlington,	  Virginia	  
http://trustedci.org/2016summit	  	  
Updated	  August	  17,	  2016	  
PC:	  Steve	  Barnet,	  Tony	  Baylis,	  Mike	  Corn,	  Barb	  Fossum,	  Ardoth	  Hassler,	  Susan	  Ramsey,	  George	  Strawn	  	  
Organizers:	  Leslee	  Cooper,	  Ryan	  Kiser,	  Jim	  Marsteller,	  Susan	  Sons,	  Jim	  Basney,	  Amy	  Starzynski	  Coddens,	  Von	  Welch	  
Training	  Day	  Tuesday,	  August	  16,	  2016	  http://trustedci.org/2016training/	  
8:00am	   Registration	  and	  Continental	  Breakfast	  (Pre-­‐Function	  Hemingway)	  
9:00am	   Morning	  and	  All	  Day	  Training	  Sessions	  Begin	  
● Log	  Analysis	  Training	  with	  CTSC	  and	  Bro
● Federated	  Identity	  Management	  for	  Research	  Organizations
● REN-­‐ISAC	  Cyberthreat	  Training	  (30	  Minute	  Intro)	  /	  Developing	  Cybersecurity
Programs	  for	  NSF	  Projects
● Building	  a	  NIST	  Risk	  Management	  Framework	  for	  HIPAA	  and	  FISMA	  Compliance
● Secure	  Coding	  Practices	  and	  Automated	  Assessment	  Tools
11:00am	   Coffee	  Break	  
11:30am	   Training	  Sessions	  Resume	  
1:00pm	  	   Lunch	  provided	  
2:00pm	  	   Afternoon	  Training	  Sessions	  Begin	  and	  All	  Day	  Training	  Sessions	  Resume	  
● Log	  Analysis	  Training	  with	  CTSC	  and	  Bro
● Federated	  Identity	  Management	  for	  Research	  Organizations
● Securing	  Legacy	  Industrial	  Control	  Systems
● Building	  the	  Modern	  Research	  Data	  Portal	  Using	  the	  Globus	  Platform
● Secure	  Software	  Engineering	  Best	  Practices
4:00pm	  	   Coffee	  Break	  
4:30pm	  	   Training	  Sessions	  Resume	  
6:00pm	  	   Sessions	  End	  
Evening:	   Dinner	  on	  your	  own	  
2	  
Plenary	  Session	  Wednesday,	  August	  17,	  2016	  F. Scott	  Fitzgerald	  AB
8:00am	   Sign-­‐In	  and	  Continental	  Breakfast	  (Pre-­‐Function	  AB)	  
9:00am	   Welcome	  and	  Goals	  (Jim	  Marsteller)	  
9:10am	   NSF	  Address:	  	  Irene	  Qualters,	  Division	  Director:	  ACI	  	  
9:30am	   Keynote	  Address:	  	  Peter	  Kuper	  
10:30am	   NSF	  Cybersecurity	  Center	  of	  Excellence	  (Von	  Welch)	  
11:00am	   Coffee	  Break	  
11:30am	   Security	  at	  the	  Texas	  Advanced	  Computing	  Center	  (Nathaniel	  Mendoza,	  Patrick	  Storm)	  
12:00pm	   Gemini	  Observatory	  Cybersecurity	  Program	  (Chris	  Morrison,	  Tim	  Minick)	  
12:30pm	   Security	  at	  LIGO	  (Abe	  Singer)	  
1:00pm	  	   Lunch	  and	  Table	  Topics	  -­‐	  Lunch	  provided	  
2:30pm	  	   The	  Science	  DMZ	  as	  a	  Security	  Architecture	  (Michael	  Sinatra)	  
3:00pm	  	   Cybersecurity	  Budgeting	  (Scott	  Russell,	  Craig	  Jackson,	  Bob	  Cowles)	  
3:30pm	  	   Provenance	  Based	  Security:	  Toward	  Building	  Provenance-­‐Aware	  Secure	  Systems	  
(Ragib	  Hasan)	  
4:00pm	  	   Coffee	  Break	  
4:30pm	  	   Computing	  Grid	  Access	  with	  Federated	  Identity	  (Mine	  Altunay,	  Dave	  Dykstra)	  
5:00pm	  	   Using	  Globus	  Authorization	  to	  Streamline	  the	  Creation,	  Integration,	  and	  Use	  of	  Research	  
Services	  (Ian	  Foster,	  Lee	  Liming,	  Steve	  Tuecke)	  
5:30pm	  	   Open	  Discussion	  /	  Summary	  of	  the	  Day’s	  Findings	  (Jim	  Marsteller	  /	  Von	  Welch)	  
6:00pm	  	   Dismissal	  
Evening:	   Dinner	  on	  your	  own.	  	  	  
Informal	  Dinner	  Gathering	  at	  TBD	  
3	  
Plenary	  Session	  (continued)Thursday,	  August	  18,	  2016	  F. Scott	  Fitzgerald	  AB
8:00am	   Sign-­‐In	  and	  Continental	  Breakfast	  (Pre-­‐Function	  AB)	  
8:50am	   Welcome	  Back	  (Jim	  Marsteller)	  
9:00am	   Panel:	  “FBI	  Case	  216	  Retrospective	  Panel”	  
Moderator:	  Jamie	  Allan,	  Program	  Director	  -­‐	  Ocean	  Drilling	  Program,	  NSF	  
Panelists:	  
RuthAnne	  Bevier	  (Caltech)	  
Clifford	  Jacobs	  (Clifford	  A.	  Jacobs	  Consulting,	  LLC)	  
Victor	  Hazlewood	  (University	  of	  Tennessee)	  
Adam	  Slagell	  (NCSA)	  
10:00am	   GENI	  Cybersecurity:	  Mechanism,	  Policies	  and	  Procedures	  (Vicraj	  Thomas)	  
10:30am	   Strengthening	  Trustworthy	  Science:	  Ideas	  for	  Adapting	  NIST	  Risk	  Management	  
Framework	  to	  the	  NSF	  Cooperative	  Agreement	  for	  Large	  Facilities	  	  
(Tim	  Howard,	  Steve	  Barnet)	  
11:00am	   Coffee	  Break	  
11:30am	   Compliance	  Panel:	  FISMA,	  FERPA,	  and	  HIPAA,	  Oh	  My!	  
(Susan	  Ramsey,	  Anurag	  Shankar)	  
12:00pm	   Open	  Discussion	  /	  Summary	  of	  Summit	  Findings	  
(Von	  Welch,	  Jim	  Marsteller)	  
12:30pm	   Adjourn	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Mine Altunay  ​is a computer science researcher focusing on information security. At Fermilab, she is 
responsible for ensuring scientific infrastructure meet the laboratory's security requirements and 
provide a secure and convenient environment for our scientists. In addition to her role at Fermilab, 
she is responsible for security of the worldwide CMS collaboration and also act as the OSG Security 
Officer.  She has a PhD in information security from North Carolina State University. Her main 
research focus has been on identity management in distributed collaborative environments such as 
cloud computing. In the past, she was a research fellow at IBM Research at Tokyo Japan, and was a 
member of IBM Extreme Blue team and IBM HiPODS teams.  
* 
Steve Barnet​ has specialized in supporting scientific and academic computing for nearly 20 years. 
During that time, he has worked in multiple domains including storage, networking, high­throughput 
computing, and security. He handled his first incident in 1995, a compromised Solaris system 
providing several important infrastructure services. 
Steve currently works for the IceCube project, a kilometer scale neutrino detector located at the 
geographic South Pole. He began collaborating with CTSC in 2013 to develop a Cybersecurity plan for 
the IceCube facility. 
* 
Dr. Jim Basney ​is a senior research scientist in the cybersecurity group at the National Center for 
Supercomputing Applications at the University of Illinois at Urbana­Champaign. Jim's area of expertise 
is identity management for scientific collaborations. He is PI of the CILogon project and co­PI of the 
Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure, FeduShare, and Software Assurance 
Marketplace projects. Jim also contributes to the LIGO, LSST, and XSEDE projects. He received his PhD 
in computer sciences from the University of Wisconsin­Madison. 
* 
Tony Baylis​ of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is the Laboratory's Director for the Office of 
Strategic Diversity and Inclusion Programs. In this position, he is the senior management advocate for 
diversity and inclusion for the Laboratory. The Office of Strategic Diversity and Inclusion Programs 
partners with senior management to develop strategies, initiatives, programs, and activities that 
promote the creation of a diverse and inclusive workforce and work environment. Tony serves as the 
Laboratory's EEO, AA and Diversity compliance officer as well. In conjunction with these tasks, Tony is 
responsible for overseeing the laboratory's interactions and successful execution in building, 
partnering and collaborating with governmental, educational, industrial, community interests and 
other stakeholders. LLNL has had a long history in working with Minority Serving Institutions, 
specifically relationships with American Indian Institutions, Hispanic Institutions and Historically Black 
College and Universities. He represents the Laboratory on the subjects of Diversity and Inclusion, 
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STEM, Outreach Efforts, and Student Programs. 
Tony's career represents 26 years of administrative, project, program, technical and organizational 
management. He has worked in a scientific and technical environment for over 20 years and has 
worked as an consultant in industry as well. Tony has extensive experience networking with a broad 
range of academic, industry, government and non­profit organizations that has educated him and 
helped him in his career. He serves on a number of conference program committees and advisory 
boards that promote STEM and diversity in science and technical careers. He has been an NSF 
reviewer and PI/Co­Pi for the Broadening Participation in Computing Program. Tony is also an ACM 
and ACM SIGGRAPH member, and serves as the Treasurer for ACM SIGGRAPH. He is a graduate of the 
University of Illinois.  
* 
RuthAnne Bevier,​ ​is the Chief Information Security Officer at the California Institute of Technology. 
She joined Caltech in 1996, and has worked in Information Security there since 1999.  In 2004 she 
served on the program committee for the first of what became the NSF Cybersecurity Summit for 
Large Facilities and Cyberinfrastructure.  More recently she served as a reviewer for the 2104 National 
Academies publication, _At The Nexus of Cybersecurity and Public Policy: Some Basic Concepts and 
Issues.   
RuthAnne received her Master's degree in Library and Information Science from the University of 
California, Berkeley. 
* 
Leslee A. Cooper  ​serves as the Administrative & Finance Director at Indiana University’s Center for 
Applied Cybersecurity Research (CACR). She is a graduate of the IU School of Business (B.S. ’93). Leslee 
comes to the CACR and CTSC from a background in Management, Finance and Accounting. She has 
worked with government divisions, as well as in the private sector. 
* 
Michael Corn ​ is the Deputy CIO and CISO for Brandeis University. His areas of interest include privacy, 
identity management, and cloud services. He has been an active speaker and author on security and 
privacy and has participated in numerous Educause and Internet2 initiatives. He is a member of the 
Internet2 Netplus Product Advisory Board and until recently was also a member of the Box.com and 
Splunk Product Advisory Boards, as well as the Kuali Ready Product Board. 
Prior to joining Brandeis he was the CISO and Chief Privacy and Security Officer of the University of 
Illinois at Urbana­Champaign. He is a graduate of the University of Colorado at Boulder and the 
University of Illinois at Urbana­Champaign. 
* 
Robert (Bob) Cowles​ is principal in BrightLite Information Security performing cybersecurity 
assessments and consulting in research and education about information security and identity 
management. He served as CISO at SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory (1997­2012); participated in 
security policy development for LHC Computing Grid (2001­2008); and was an instructor at University 
of Hong Kong in information security (2000­2003). 
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* 
Dominique Dalanni ​is a junior at California State University, Dominguez Hills where she is pursuing a 
Bachelor’s of Science in Computer Science.  In addition to her studies, Ms. Dalanni is currently the 
president of the Women in Stem Club, vice president and student advocate for the Computing 
Alliance of Hispanic Serving Institutions (CAHSI) Club CSUDH chapter, and secretary of the 
Cybersecurity Club at her university.  She also serves as a research assistant in a project funded by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and in 2015 was selected to represent her university as a CSU Trustee 
Award recipient and scholar. 
After completing her undergraduate education, Ms. Dalanni hopes to pursue a graduate degree at 
George Washington University in Computer Science with a specialization in Cybersecurity.  Once she 
has received her graduate degree, Ms. Dalanni would like explore job opportunities which focus on 
threat analysis, governance, or on the overall security of industrial control systems. 
* 
Jeannette Dopheide  ​is an education outreach coordinator at NCSA. Her experience in education and 
outreach began as a high school teacher before moving onto business systems analysis and 
applications training for a commercial software company. Jeannette joined CTSC and NCSA in 2014 
and works primarily on education outreach for projects that impact both CTSC and NCSA, including 
the Bro Project. Jeannette is a graduate of Illinois State University. 
* 
Dave Dykstra​ received his PhD in Computer Science from the University of Illinois at 
Urbana­Champaign.  For the first part of his career he worked for AT&T and Lucent, where he was 
best known for being the leader of the Exptools project that distributed software binaries to 
developers throughout the company, mostly open source software.  During that time he also led the 
open source rsync project for a year.  For the past 10 years he has been at Fermilab where his primary 
duties have been supporting the Frontier Distributed Database system for CMS and ATLAS, the 
Worldwide LHC Computing Grid's squid web proxy caching network, and the Open Science Grid's 
installation of the CernVM Filesystem, and also doing security research for the Open Science Grid. 
* 
Vitaly Ford  ​is a 5th year doctoral student in Computer Science at Tennessee Tech University. His 
research areas include privacy and information security in the Smart Grid as well as cybersecurity 
education. He is one of the founders and an advisor for CyberEagles cybersecurity club at Tennessee 
Tech. Vitaly promotes cybersecurity education and training among students at the National 
Cybersecurity Student Association as an Advisory Board member. His dissertation topic is about 
developing an efficient privacy­preserving advanced metering infrastructure supporting fine­grained 
data analysis. In his free time, Vitaly enjoys playing table tennis and chess as well as participating in 
Capture The Flag cybersecurity competitions. His career goal is to become a faculty member after 
graduation. 
* 
Barbara Fossum​ is a senior executive with over 25 years of leadership and management experience in 
higher academic and government sectors including high performance computing, data visualization, 
engineering and academic research. Barbara contributed several federally funded grants including the 
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Network for Engineering Simulations where she successfully directed all operations and the 
development of a curated data repository for all earthquake engineering data.  She is currently the 
CEO of BMF Consulting, providing extensive experience in human resource planning and operations, 
organizational change, team building, organizational effectiveness and facilitative leadership. 
* 
Ian Foster ​is a Professor of Computer Science at the University of Chicago and a Senior Scientist and 
Distinguished Fellow at Argonne National Laboratory. Originally from New Zealand, he has lived in 
Chicago for longer than he likes to admit. Ian has a long record of research contributions in 
high­performance computing, distributed systems, and data­driven discovery. He has also led US and 
international projects that have produced widely used software systems and scientific computing 
infrastructures. He has published hundreds of scientific papers and six books on these and other 
topics. Ian is an elected fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the 
Association for Computing Machinery, and the British Computer Society. His awards include the 
British Computer Society's Lovelace Medal and the IEEE Tsutomu Kanai award. 
* 
Nikita Golubets​ is​ ​a student majoring in Information Assurance & Cyber Defense with a main focus in 
Network Security/Administration at Eastern Michigan University. He enjoys taking part in Information 
Security competitions such as ISTS (The Information Security Talent Search) and CCDC (National 
Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition). After graduation, he would like to obtain a position that will 
allow him to gain experience in either malware analysis or system administration. 
* 
Vlad Grigorescu​ is a Security Engineer for the Incident Response and Security team at the National 
Center for Supercomputing Applications. Vlad is also a core developer on The Bro Project. In addition 
to his work on Bro he is the creator and developer of Brownian, a web interface for interacting with 
Bro logs. Vlad earned a B.S. in computer engineering from the University of Illinois at 
Urbana­Champaign. 
* 
Ragib Hasan,  ​Ph.D., is a tenure­track Assistant Professor at the Department of Computer and 
Information Sciences at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. 
Hasan explores research on cloud security, the Internet of Things, digital forensics, mobile malware 
security, secure provenance, biomedical device security, social network security, and database 
security. Hasan is the founder of the Secure and Trustworthy Computing Lab (SECRETLab) at UAB. He 
is also a member of the UAB Center for Information Assurance and Joint Forensics Research and a 
member of the NIST Working group on Cloud Forensics. 
Prior to joining UAB, He received his Ph.D. and M.S. in Computer Science from the University of Illinois 
at Urbana Champaign in October, 2009, and December, 2005, respectively, and was an NSF/CRA 
Computing Innovation Fellow post­doc at the Department of Computer Science, Johns Hopkins 
University. 
Dr. Hasan’s research is supported by the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Naval 
Research, the National Science Foundation, Facebook Inc., Google Inc., and Amazon Inc. He is a 2014 
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awardee of the prestigious NSF CAREER Award from the National Science Foundation for his work on 
cloud security. Dr. Hasan is also a recipient of the 2015 mBillionth Award for m­learning, the 2013 
Google RISE Award, a 2013 Information Society Innovation Fund Award. 2014 Deutsche­Welle Best of 
Blogs and Online Innovation award for his BanglaBraille project, a 2011 Google Faculty Research 
Award, the 2009 NSF Computing Innovation Fellowship and the 2003 Chancellor Award and Gold 
Medal from Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology. He is a founding member of 
Wikimedia Bangladesh chapter, a long term administrator of Bangla and English Wikipedias, and also 
the founder of Shikkhok.com – an award­winning online education platform for advancing STEM 
education in rural areas of India and Bangladesh which has won the 2013 Google RISE Award and 
2013 Information Society Innovation Fund Award. 
* 
Ardoth Hassler​ is Associate Vice President of University Information Services at Georgetown 
University.  Her work focuses on policy, planning and research, including being the PI for NSF CC­NIE 
and CC­IIE awards. In addition, she is Interim Director of the Student Information Systems group. 
Ardoth was on loan to the National Science Foundation 2007­2011 where she served as Senior 
Information Technology Advisor in the Office of the Chief Information Officer in the NSF Office of 
Information and Resource Management, Division of Information Systems. Her activities included work 
related to cybersecurity best practices for large research facilities, working on technology policy for 
the Foundation and large research facilities, assisting NSF in joining the InCommon Federation and 
introducing concepts of single­sign­on logon to Research.gov, leading the “SSN Be Gone” project to 
remove SSNs from FastLane and other systems where there was no business need, working on NSF’s 
“Got Green”, initiative, etc.  She has prior experience serving on the program committees of the NSF 
Cybersecurity Summit, EDUCAUSE Annual Conferences, etc.  She has a BS in Math (CS minor) from 
Oklahoma State University and an MS in Biostatistics from the University of Oklahoma. 
* 
Victor Hazlewood  ​is the Chief Operating Officer of the Joint Institute for Computational Sciences 
(JICS) at the University of Tennessee responsible for Networking, Security and Operations with over 27 
years of experience in High Performance Computing (HPC) in the research community. Victor has 
extensive security knowledge and experience in the academic research environment including 
participation in the TeraGrid and XSEDE Incident Response program and participation in the 
community response to the 2004­2005 Stakkato incident. Victor is currently the Deputy Director of 
Operations for XSEDE and is PI on the UT portion of the NSF collaborative award for the DANCES 
software defined networking project (​http://www.dances­sdn.org/​). 
* 
Randy Heiland  ​is a Senior Systems Analyst/Programmer at IU’s Center for Applied Cybersecurity 
Research. He has spent most of his career developing software for a wide range of science and 
engineering disciplines ­ in industry, government labs, and academia. Since 2013, he has been part of 
the NSF CTSC project (trustedci.org) and contributed to several engagements 
(trustedci.org/engagements). He has broad interests in mathematics and science and enjoys sharing 
those passions with young people. (MS/Computer Science, U. Utah; MA/Mathematics, Arizona State 
U.) 
* 
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Todd Herring ​is the Membership Services Director for REN­ISAC. He  ​has worked as an IT professional 
for Indiana University, in one capacity or another, for over 20 years, cutting his teeth in a Novell world 
with command prompts and minuscule amounts of memory and disk compared to today.  He became 
more deeply focused on security back in the early 2000s, when it became apparent that unprotected 
systems could be compromised in a matter of minutes.  As a network systems admin, he was 
responsible for securing servers and workstations; configuring solid computer builds; configuring 
firewalls, IPSec, and group policy objects; and documenting procedures and change management 
activities.  More recently, Mr. Herring has been involved with IT security compliance as part of an 
enterprise risk management project at IU.  His role at REN­ISAC is focused on membership and partner 
relationships, leading projects geared toward improved services. 
* 
Elisa Heymann ​is a Senior Scientist at the Computer Sciences Department of the University of 
Wisconsin­Madison, and an Associate Professor in the Computer Architecture and Operating Systems 
Department at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB). She co­directs the MIST software 
vulnerability assessment project in collaboration with her colleagues at the University of Wisconsin. 
Heymann is part of CTSC, the NFS cyber security center for excellence, where she works on Software 
Assurance training and engagements.  Heymann carries out training in universities, companies, and 
conferences around the world. 
Heymann's research interests include security and resource management for Grid and Cloud 
environments, and cyber­security in transportation. Her research is supported by NSF, the Spanish 
government, the European Commission, and NATO. 
Heymann received her M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Computer Science from the Autonomous University 
of Barcelona (Spain) in 1995 and 2001 respectively. 
* 
Tim Howard ​is the Information Technology Operations and Security Program Manager for the 
National Science Foundation U.S. Antarctic Program (USAP). Tim oversees the IT infrastructure 
operations and cybersecurity activities at 11 USAP operating locations, including three Antarctic 
research stations and two research vessels. Each year, the USAP IT infrastructure supports 118 science 
and technical events conducted by 72 academic institutions and federal agencies across eight major 
science program areas, including the IceCube Neutrino Array and the South Pole telescope. Prior to 
his arrival at NSF, Tim served as the Information Security Team Lead for NOAA's weather satellites, 
which included an assignment to the NOAA­NASA team that successfully refurbished the Deep Space 
Climate Observatory, which launched in February 2015 and is now orbiting the Sun­Earth L­1 libration 
point, where it collects solar winds measurements to help the National Weather Service provide early 
warning space weather forecasts to the energy, telecommunications, and other critical infrastructure 
sectors. Tim is a Certified Information System Security Professional (CISSP), and a Penn State grad with 
a Bachelor of Science degree in Aerospace Engineering. Tim also holds a Master of Science degree in 
Telecommunications Management from the University of Maryland University College and is currently 
participating in the Chief Information Officer certificate program at Carnegie­Mellon University.   
* 
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Craig Jackson ​ ​is Chief Policy Analyst at Indiana University's Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research 
(CACR), where his research interests include risk management, information security program 
development and governance, legal and regulatory regimes’ impact on information security, and 
identity management. He is a co­PI for the Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure 
(CTSC); he is a member of the security team for the DHS­funded Software Assurance Marketplace 
(SWAMP); and he is part of the DOE­funded XSIM (Extreme Scale Identity Management) project. He is 
a graduate of the IU Maurer School of Law (J.D.’10) and IU School of Education (M.S.’04). As a 
member of the Indiana bar, Mr. Jackson has represented government and corporate clients in 
constitutional and tort claims. His research, design, and project management background includes 
work at IU School of Education’s Center for Research on Learning and Technology and Washington 
University in St. Louis School of Medicine. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, and was a Lien Honorary 
Scholar at Washington University in St. Louis. 
* 
Deja T. Jackson  ​is an undergraduate at Kennesaw State University pursuing a degree in Computer 
Science. After receiving the National Center for Women in Technology Georgia award in 2015, she has 
been inspired to help and foster interest in computing within others; therefore has immersed herself 
in a variety of leadership positions including Student Government Senator for the College of 
Computing, and Vice­President of Object­Oriented Owls, a program designed to support women in 
computing.  She has also been active in numerous research opportunities including the Louis Stokes 
Alliance for Minority Participation and the Georgia Tech Undergraduate research program, both 
funded by the NSF. Upon graduation, Deja hopes to use her experience and knowledge to land a 
career in cyber security within the private sector.  
* 
Rasib Khan ​, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Cybersecurity in the department of Computer Science 
at Northern Kentucky University (NKU). Khan received his Ph.D. in Computer and Information Sciences 
from University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB) in 2016. He worked in the SECuRE and Trustworthy 
computing Lab (SECRETLab) at the Center for Information Assurance and Joint Forensics Research 
(The Center) at UAB while working on his research on secure service frameworks, information 
provenance, authentication and authorization in cloud, distributed, and decentralized systems. He 
served as the lead researcher at SECRETLab for the Department of Homeland Security funded project 
on secure location provenance for mobile devices. Khan was a NordSecMob European Union Erasmus 
Mundus Scholar, and received dual MS degrees in Security and Mobile Computing from Royal Institute 
of Technology (KTH), Sweden, and Aalto University (formerly Helsinki University of Technology), 
Finland in 2011. Khan also worked as the security researcher in the European Union FP7 PURSUIT 
project while working at Helsinki Institute for Information Technology (HIIT), Finland, from 2011 till 
before moving to the US in 2012. Prior to joining HIIT, he worked in the Cloud Security group at 
Nomadic Lab, Ericsson Research, Finland, where he worked on decentralized authentication systems 
and cloud computing frameworks.  
* 
Ryan Kiser, ​IT Specialist, Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research 
* 
Scott Koranda​, PhD, specializes on identity management architecture for research organizations. 
Since 2008, Scott Koranda has designed, deployed, and supported production SAML infrastructures 
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including both the Shibboleth Identity Provider (IdP) and Service Provider (SP) software, for the 
research and education sectors. 
A member of the Laser Interferometer Gravitational­Wave Observatory (LIGO) collaboration for over 
10 years, Scott has served as the lead architect for the LIGO Identity and Access Management project 
since 2007. He was co­principal investigator on the NSF grant that funds COmanage development, and 
is a consultant with Spherical Cow Group. 
* 
Peter Kuper ​is a Partner with In­Q­Tel, the nonprofit strategic investment firm that identifies, adapts, 
and delivers innovative technologies to support the missions of the U.S. Intelligence Community. 
Peter actively seeks and works with private companies with a particular focus on security and 
enterprise software. Previously, Peter was the lead software analyst for Morgan Stanley where he 
published industry leading investment reports and led over 18 public transactions. 
Peter was a Wall Street analyst for 15 years offering him the opportunity to work with some of the 
most dynamic and talented public and private companies and the world’s leading investment 
professionals. As a visible voice for the software industry, Peter has given numerous presentations to 
professional and government groups and has been interviewed on CNBC, Bloomberg Television, and 
quoted in most leading publications including ​The Wall Street Journal​  and ​The Financial Times​ . He has 
also published articles in  ​IEEE Magazine​ . Peter currently serves as an adviser to the Pacific Northwest 
National Lab and is a Faculty member for IANS. 
* 
Lee Liming ​is a Technical Communications Manager at the Computation Institute, a joint venture 
between The University of Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory. He has spent sixteen years 
working with scientists from many fields of study to build computing systems capable of supporting 
their ever­growing data and computing needs. Past collaborations have included civil engineers, space 
scientists and astronomers, climate scientists, high­energy physicists, energy scientists, cosmologists, 
social scientists and librarians, neuroscientists, cancer researchers, and, of course, computer 
scientists. Prior to working at the University of Chicago and Argonne, Lee was a Sr. Product Manager 
and Principle Engineer at ProQuest Information and Learning and an information technology manager 
at the University of Michigan. Lee received a B.S.E degree in Computer Engineering at the University 
of Michigan. 
* 
James A. Marsteller, Jr.​ (CISSP) ​ is the Chief Information Security Officer of the Pittsburgh 
Supercomputing Center,where he is responsible for ensuring the availability and integrity of the PSC's 
high performance computing assets. Jim has over 16 years experience in the information security field 
and more than 25 years of professional experience in the field of technology. He also serves as a 
member of the board for the Pittsburgh Infragard Chapter. Prior to working at PSC, he was a program 
manager for the Carnegie Mellon Research Institute that provided information security consulting 
services for government agencies and Fortune 500 companies. Jim co­leads the XSEDE Incident 
Response team and is XSEDE’s security officer.  He is a Co­PI for the Center for Trustworthy Scientific 
Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC).  Jim has served as the program chair the Cybersecurity Summit since 
2009. 
* 
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Nathaniel Mendoza ​is Chief Security Officer and Senior Network Administrator at the University Of 
Texas Austin’s, Texas Advanced Computing Center (TACC) where he leads a group of the Security, 
Network, and Systems Administrators. Current areas of work include Cloud Computing, High Speed 
Networks, Operational Security, and Compliance. Additionally, he is a part of the XSEDE security group 
and has been a member of Super Computing’s SCInet. Previous to joining TACC in 2011 he was the 
Chief Security Officer and Senior Network Engineer at the University of Tennessee Knoxville’s, 
National Institute for Computational Sciences (NICS). 
* 
Kim Milford  ​is the ​ ​Executive Director of REN­ISAC.  ​Under Executive Director Milford’s oversight, 
REN­ISAC provides research and education institutions with services that facilitate better information 
security and leads REN­ISAC operations, hosted at Indiana University. She joined Indiana University in 
2007 and served in leading strategic IT initiatives, directing the work of the University Information 
Policy Office, and as the Chief Privacy Officer. 
Previously, Milford served as the Information Security Officer at the University of Rochester, where 
she led a comprehensive information security program. As Information Security Manager at University 
of Wisconsin­Madison, she co­led the establishment of the university's information security 
department.  Millford has a J.D. from John Marshall and a B.S. in Accounting from St Louis University. 
* 
Barton Miller ​ is Professor of Computer Sciences at the University of Wisconsin. He is Chief Scientist 
for the DHS Software Assurance Marketplace research facility.  He co­directs the MIST software 
vulnerability assessment project in collaboration with his colleagues at the Autonomous University of 
Barcelona. He also leads Paradyn Parallel Performance Tool project, which is investigating 
performance and instrumentation technologies for parallel and distributed applications and systems. 
His research interests include systems security, binary and malicious code analysis and 
instrumentation extreme scale systems, parallel and distributed program measurement and 
debugging, and mobile computing. Miller's research is supported by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Energy, National Science Foundation, NATO, and various 
corporations. 
In 1988, Miller founded the field of Fuzz random software testing, which is the foundation of many 
security and software engineering disciplines. In 1992, Miller (working with his then­student, Prof. 
Jeffrey Hollingsworth, founded the field of dynamic binary code instrumentation and coined the term 
"dynamic instrumentation". Dynamic instrumentation forms the basis for his current efforts in 
malware analysis and instrumentation. 
Miller was the chair of the IDA Center for Computing Sciences Program Review Committee, a member 
of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Computing, Communications and Networking Division Review 
Committee, and has been on the U.S. Secret Service 
Electronic Crimes Task Force (Chicago Area), the Advisory Committee for Tuskegee University's High 
Performance Computing Program, and the Advisory Board for the International Summer Institute on 
Parallel Computer Architectures, Languages, and 
Algorithms in Prague. Miller is an active participant in the European Union APART performance tools 
initiative. 
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Miller received his Ph.D. degree in Computer Science from the University of California, Berkeley in 
1984. He is a Fellow of the ACM. 
* 
Tim Minick​ is the Director of Information Technology for HPM Building Supply, an employee owned 
retailer, manufacturer, and building materials company with branches across the Hawaiian Islands.  In 
the decade prior to joining HPM Tim worked at AURA/Gemini Observatory, relocating to Hawaii from 
the U.S. mainland in 2005.   Beginning in 2010 Tim managed the Information Technology Services 
department across the Gemini sites in Hawaii and Chile.  A veteran IT professional, with over 25­years 
of experience in automotive and industrial computer manufacturing, pharmaceutical, and astronomy 
industries, he is an active, technical manager in services delivery, cybersecurity, and project 
management.  
Tim holds certifications in IT security (Certified Information System Security Professional), project 
management (PRINCE2 Foundation) and virtualization (VMware Certified Professional).  He attended 
Schoolcraft College, Washtenaw College, Eastern Michigan University, holds a degree in Digital 
Equipment Technology, and has studied business management & finance as well as mechanical 
engineering.  Tim is currently immersed in the MSc Information Technology Management program at 
the University of Liverpool.  
A long time supporter of the Akamai Workforce Initiative in Hawaii he actively participates with the 
program’s selection committee and as a mentor.  Tim is also a member of the University of 
Hawaii/Hawaii Community College Information Technology Program Advisory Committee, providing 
curriculum advisement. 
Tim and his immediate family make their home in Hilo, Hawaii.  In his spare time you might find (or 
hear) him spinning classic rock on vinyl at his home, or at the local racetrack, where, as the Regional 
Executive of the Big Island of Hawaii Sports Car Club of America, he and a team of dedicated 
supporters operate monthly race events. 
* 
Chris Morrison  ​(CISSP) recently took the position of Information Technology Services department 
manager for the AURA/Gemini Observatory in Hilo, Hawaii and La Serena, Chile, and has been the 
Cyber Security liaison for the center for the past seven years. As an IT professional with 24 years 
experience, Chris has been involved in various aspects of information technology and Cyber Security 
within the scientific community including system design, identity management, risk assessment, 
awareness training, incident response, contract and project management. Prior to joining Gemini in 
2006, Chris held positions at ESO's VLT project in Chile and the European Space Agency in Germany.  
* 
Anita Nikolich​ is Program Director for Cybersecurity in the Division of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure 
at the National Science Foundation (NSF). Prior to her work at the NSF she served as the Executive 
Director of Infrastructure at the University of Chicago. Past assignments include Director of Global 
Data Networking at Aon and Director of Security for Worldcom. She has explored how information 
technology and secure networking can best support the creation and sharing of scientific knowledge 
in virtual, mobile and physical contexts. She holds a Master of Science from The University of 
Pennsylvania and a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Chicago. 
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* 
Irene Qualters ​is the Division Director of the Division of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure at NSF. As a 
recognized leader in cyberinfrastructure infrastructure, she represents NSF in several interagency and 
international efforts that span software, data, and computation.   For example, she has represented 
NSF in the creation of the presidential initiative, NSCI. 
Prior to her NSF career, Irene had a distinguished 30­year career in industry, with a number of 
executive leadership positions in the technology sector, in startups as well as a long tenure at Cray 
Research leading R&D, and six years with Merck Research Labs leading their Global 
Cyberinfrastructure for Research. 
* 
Susan Ramsey ​ is a Risk Assessor and Security Engineer at the National Center for Atmospheric 
Research. She has over twenty years of experience building enterprise infrastructure and cloud 
computing. She joined NCAR in 2014 and promptly launched multiple initiatives to tackle compliance 
and identity management.  Her latest projects include building a FISMA moderate segment and an 
organization wide Continuous Monitoring Plan. She has an MS in Computer Information Technology 
from Regis University, (thesis on Vulnerability Assessment). She is currently working towards a second 
Master of Science degree, in Information Security Engineering, from SANS Technical Institute. 
* 
Warren Raquel ​is a Senior Security Engineer ​at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications. 
His duties include security operations, incident response and security awareness for NCSA, Blue 
Waters and XSEDE. He has given talks and taught classes on Digital Forensics and Incident Response, 
two fields in which has specialized in for the last decade. 
* 
Scott Russell ​ is the current Postdoctoral Fellow in Information Security Law & Policy at the Indiana 
University Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research. Scott’s work has emphasized private sector 
cybersecurity best practices, data aggregation and the First and Fourth Amendments, and 
cybersecurity norms under international law. Scott studied Computer Science and History at the 
University of Virginia and received his J.D. from the Indiana University, Maurer School of Law. 
* 
Phil Salkie ​ is a computer scientist who has been working as an industrial controls and automation 
engineer since 1984. His software and hardware designs serve sectors as diverse as food packaging, 
broadcast television, emergency power generation, water purification, sewage processing, surgical 
suture manufacture, biopharmaceuticals, specialty chemicals, laundry transport, semiconductor 
equipment manufacture, and nuclear power plant infrastructure.  He is managing partner of Jeneriah, 
Industrial Automation. 
* 
Anurag Shankar ​ is a senior security analyst at Indiana University’s Center for Applied Cybersecurity 
Research (CACR). His expertise includes regulatory compliance (HIPAA and FISMA) and cybersecurity 
risk management. He has helped numerous institutions tackle HIPAA compliance and been 
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responsible for developing a NIST based risk management framework and using it to align IU's central 
research and enterprise cyberinfrastructures with HIPAA.  His background also includes nearly twenty 
years with IU’s central IT organization developing, delivering, and managing Unix support, massive 
data storage, the national Teragrid project, and supporting the research mission of the IU School of 
Medicine. He played a key role in building IU's research data storage environments,  for supporting 
IU's Indiana Genomics Initiative and other life sciences efforts, and for creating information 
infrastructures and technology solutions for the Indiana Clinical and Translational Sciences Institute 
(CTSI). He is a computational astrophysicist by training (Ph.D. University of Illinois, '90). 
* 
Michael Sinatra ​has worked for the Energy Sciences Network (ESnet) since 2011, in the capacity of 
Network and Systems Engineer and Security Strategist.  Prior to that, he worked for UC Berkeley for 
19 years in both research and administrative positions.  He has been interested in the nexus between 
system, security, and network for two decades. Sinatra holds degrees from Cornell and UC Berkeley. 
* 
Abe Singer​ works in the Security Group at the National Energy Research Supercomputer Center 
(NERSC) at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory.  Until recently, he was the the Chief Security Officer for the 
Laser Interferometer Gravitational Wave Observatory, operated by the California Institute of 
Technology.  Prior to that he was the CSO of the San Diego Supercomputer Center at U.C. San Diego, 
and has had past lives as a private sector consultant, programmer, and system administrator. 
* 
Adam Slagell  ​received an M.S. in computer science from the University of Illinois at Urbana­Campaign 
in 2003, a masters degree in mathematics from Northern Illinois University (NIU) in 2000, and a B.S. in 
mathematics from NIU in 1999. He currently serves as the director of the Cybersecurity Division and 
Chief Information Security Officer at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) 
where he co­leads the security team for the NSF­funded XSEDE federation, serves as liaison for the 
Bro Project at the Software Freedom Conservatory, and is a co­PI for the NSF Bro Center of Excellence, 
which brings its network security monitoring expertise and support to NSF­funded 
cyber­infrastructure and Higher Ed. 
* 
Susan Sons​ serves as a Senior Systems Analyst at Indiana University's Center for Applied Cybersecurity 
Research, having come from a background in abuse management, software development, and 
pentesting.  In her free time, Susan volunteers as director of the Internet Civil Engineering 
Institute, a nonprofit dedicated to supporting and securing the common software infrastructure we all 
depend on, and as a search­and­rescue and disaster relief worker. 
* 
Amy Starzynski Coddens​ serves as the Education, Outreach and Training Manager at Indiana 
University’s Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research (CACR). She is a graduate of the IU School of 
Education (M.S. ’06 & M.S. ’09). Amy comes to the CACR and CTSC from a background in P­16 
education and outreach. She has worked for the government, in industry and in academia, 
contributing to projects with the New England Research Institute, Harvard’s PEAR Institute, the United 
States Department of Education’s Office of Special Education Programs, NASA and the IU Kelley School 
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of Business. 
* 
George Strawn ​ ​had a short industrial career (4 years with IBM), a long academic career (30 years at 
Iowa State) and a pretty long government career (24 years at NSF). At Iowa State he served terms as 
chair of the Computer Science department and as director of the Computation Center. At NSF he 
invented the Internet (well, he was NSFnet program director and then division director of 
networking), then CISE executive officer and acting assistant director, and then served as CIO. He was 
detailed to OSTP in 2009 where he served as director of the NITRD NCO until his retirement in July of 
'15. But he failed retirement and has returned to work at NAS as board director for the Board on 
Research Data and Information. He has a PhD in mathematics from Iowa State and is a fellow of AAAS. 
* 
Patrick Storm​ is a Network Engineer with the Texas Advanced Computing Center at the University of 
Texas at Austin. Storm received his undergraduate degree from Oklahoma State University in 
Management Information Systems with an emphasis on Information Assurance. He joined the TACC 
team in March of 2013 and has spent most of his time there focusing on networking, operational 
security and incident response. Storm has been a part of the SCinet security team for the SC14, SC15, 
and SC16 Conferences, and is also a member of the XSEDE incident response and security teams. 
* 
Dr. Vicraj (Vic) Thomas ​is a Scientific Directory at BBN Technologies. He leads the Experimenter 
Support and Advocacy group within the GENI Project Office. The GENI Project Office provides the NSF 
with program management and systems engineering support in the design and development  
of GENI. Dr. Thomas' research interests include dependable systems and systems  
security.  On the GENI project, Dr. Thomas was one of the systems engineers that developed a 
security plan for GENI.  In the past he was a co­PI on an intrusion detector correlation project funded 
by the DARPA CyberPanel program and the PI of a project on the DARPA Cougaar program that 
developed intrusion detection agents. 
* 
Steve Tuecke ​co­leads the Globus project ( ​www.globus.org ​) with Dr. Ian Foster, and is Deputy 
Director of the Computation Institute at The University of Chicago (UC) and Argonne National 
Laboratory. His focus is on the development of sustainable, cloud­based, software­as­a­service data 
management solutions to accelerate research. Prior to UC, Steven was co­founder, CEO and CTO of 
Univa Corporation from 2004­2008, providing open source and proprietary software for the 
high­performance computing and cloud computing markets.  Before that, he spent 14 years at 
Argonne as research staff. Tuecke graduated with a B.A in mathematics and computer science from 
St. Olaf College. 
* 
Von Welch​ is the director of Indiana University’s Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research (CACR) 
and PI for the NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (CTSC). Additionally he is the CISO of the 
Software Assurance Market Place, a DHS­funded facility to foster software assurance and software 
assurance research, and serves on the InCommon Steering Committee as an advisor for the research 
community. Previously he has worked with a range of high­visibility projects to provide cybersecurity 
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to the broader scientific and engineering community, including TeraGrid, Open Science Grid, Ocean 
Observatory Infrastructure, and GENI. His work in software and standards includes authoring two IETF 
RFCS and the contributing to the creation of the well­known CILogon and MyProxy projects. 
* 
Dr. Carol Wilkinson is a visitor to NSF from the California Institute of Technology, providing support to                                 
the Large Facilities Office (LFO) on issues regarding the management of large scientific facilities. Her                             
major roles while at NSF include being the LFO liaison to various facilities under construction, assisting                               
with revisions of the Large Facilities Manual, and acting as the LFO liaison for Cyber Infrastructure. Her                                 
background includes research in experimental particle physics and experience in the operation and                         
construction of large scientific facilities. She has formal training in facility and project management                           
from the Project Management Institute (PMI) and other institutions. She earned certification in                         
project management from the Stanford Advanced Project Management Institute. 
Dr. Wilkinson gained familiarity with NSF construction projects funded through Major Research                       
Equipment and Facility Construction (MREFC) accounts by serving for ten years as the project                           
manager for the Advanced LIGO (Laser Interferometer Gravitational­Wave Observatory) development                   
and construction. She also served on NSF construction project review panels for DUSEL, ALMA, OOI,                             
NEON, and LSST. Previously, Dr. Wilkinson served as group leader and project manager for the                             
construction and operation of two DOE funded accelerator facilities (DARHT) at Los Alamos National                           
Laboratory before becoming project manager for the nuclear weapons testing program at DARHT                         
before joining LIGO in 2003. She joined NSF on an Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) assignment                             
in November 2013. 
* 
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Appendix C 
Call for Participation 
Call for Participation
2016 NSF Cybersecurity Summit for Large Facilities and Cyberinfrastructure
August 16 - 18 ✶ Westin Arlington Gateway ✶ Arlington, VA 
http://trustedci.org/2016summit/ 
Theme:  Strengthening Trustworthy Science 
It is our great pleasure to announce that the 2016 Summit will take place Tuesday, August 16th 
through Thursday, August 18th, at the Westin Arlington Gateway near the National Science 
Foundation Headquarters in Arlington, VA. On August 16th, the Summit will offer a full day of 
information security training tailored for the NSF community. The second and third days will 
follow a workshop format designed to increase the NSF community’s understanding of 
cybersecurity strategies that strengthen trustworthy science: what data, processes, and systems 
are crucial to the scientific mission, what risks they face, and how to protect them. 
About the Summit 
Since 2004, the annual NSF Cybersecurity Summit has served as a valuable part of the process 
of securing the NSF scientific cyberinfrastructure by providing the community a forum for 
education, sharing experiences, building relationships, and establishing best practices. 
The NSF cyberinfrastructure ecosystem presents an aggregate of complex cybersecurity needs 
(e.g., scientific data and instruments, unique computational and storage resources, complex 
collaborations) as compared to other organizations and sectors. This community has a unique 
opportunity to develop information security practices tailored to these needs, as well as break 
new ground on efficient, effective ways to protect information assets while supporting science. 
The Summit will bring together leaders in NSF cyberinfrastructure and cybersecurity to continue 
the processes initiated in 2013-2015: Building a trusting, collaborative community, and seriously 
addressing that community’s core cybersecurity challenges. 
The Summit seeks proposals for presentations, breakout and training sessions. It offers 
opportunities for student scholarships. 
Proposing Content for the Summit 
There are many ways to contribute to the Cybersecurity Summit.  We are open to proposals for 
full- or half-day training sessions, for plenary presentations, and for breakout sessions.  More 
specific information on each of those is available below.  Submissions should be sent 
to CFP@trustedci.org by June 10th.  Responses should go out by June 24th to ensure adequate 
planning time for presenters. 
Proposing a Plenary Presentation 
Please submit brief white papers focused on NSF Large Facilities’ unmet cybersecurity 
challenges, lessons learned, and/or significant successes for presentation during the Summit 
Plenary Session (Aug 17-18).  White papers (and presentations) may be in the form of position 
papers and/or narratives and may be one to five pages in length. 
All submitted white papers will be included in the 2016 summit report. The Program Committee 
will select the most relevant, reasoned, and broadly interesting for presentation. A limited 
amount of funding is available to assist with travel for accepted submissions. 
Submission deadline: June 10th 
Submit to: CFP@trustedci.org 
Word limit:  400 to 2000 words (~1-5 single spaced pages) 
Notification of acceptance: June 24th 
Proposing a Training Session 
Training may be targeted at technical and/or management audiences, and be half-day or full-day 
in length.  Areas of interest include, but are not limited to: cybersecurity planning and programs, 
risk assessment and management, regulatory compliance, identity and access management, data 
management and provenance, networks security and monitoring, secure coding and software 
assurance, physical security in the context of information security, and information security of 
scientific and emerging technologies. The Program Committee will select the most community-
relevant and broadly interesting training sessions for presentation during the first day of the 
summit (Aug 16). 
We generally prefer training sessions  with some hands-on or interactive component over those 
that can be equally well presented in a non-interactive format (e.g. online videos), whether that 
component is a series of review Q&As, the opportunity to work directly with a piece of software 
or other tool, or a planning/management activity. 
Submission deadline: June 10th 
Submit to: CFP@trustedci.org 
Word Limit:  600 words 
Notification of Acceptance:  June 24th 
Proposing Table Top Sessions 
In past years, the Summit has experimented with other formats for networking and information 
exchange, such as table-top topics at lunch.  Proposals for such an activity should be 1-2 pages in 
length and include who would run the activity, the activity’s intended audience, and a description 
of the activity itself and its expected benefits. 
Submission deadline:  June 10th 
Submit to: CFP@trustedci.org 
Word limit:  400 to 800 words (~1-2 single spaced pages) 
Notification of acceptance:  June 24th 
Information for Students 
Each year, the summit organizers invite several students to attend the summit.  Reimbursement 
of travel expenses may be available.  See http://trustedci.org/summit2016/students for more 
information. 
Notes for First-Time Presenters 
The Summit organizers want to encourage those who have not presented at previous Summits to 
share their experiences, expertise, and insights with the NSF cybersecurity community.  You 
don’t need to be perfectly polished, you just need to have something to share about your project 
or facility's experience with information security.  Feedback from last year’s Summit showed 
that there was a great deal of interest in “lessons learned” type presentations from projects 
who’ve faced cybersecurity challenges, and had to rethink some things afterwards.  We’ve put 
together a page of tips and ideas for new presenters, including proposal and presentation tips as 
well as suggested topics.  More direct coaching is available upon request. 
Please contact CFP@trustedci.org with any questions, or to request help preparing a proposal or 
getting it ready to present at the Summit. 
So you want to present at the 2016 NSF 
Cybersecurity Summit…
Welcome!  The Summit organizers wish to encourage and support participation from throughout 
the wider NSF community.  To further that mission, we’ve provided some information (below) 
to aid in the preparation of CFP responses.  Please don’t hesitate to direct questions 
to CFP@trustedci.org. 
What to Present 
This year’s theme is “Strengthening Trustworthy Science.”  This is a subject that is the 
underlying motivation for all of the cybersecurity activities we pursue.  The organizers especially 
appreciate proposals that drive this home, however, not every presentation, training session, or 
activity has to be centered around just that topic.  Please submit any idea that you think may be 
relevant to our audience.  If you would like to present, but aren’t sure of what topic to choose, 
consider the following suggestions: 
• Lessons Learned: Get beyond the brag session.  Tell the audience about something that DIDN’T go well
for your project’s cybersecurity efforts and how you overcame it.  Even if you haven’t overcome it yet,
share the questions you are struggling with and  open things up to the audience for Q&A or
brainstorming.  Too often, those doing cybersecurity in our community only see the big successes that
others do press releases about, but there is even more to learn about the things that don’t work.
• Tools: Have you discovered a new or unusual tool  or technique that enables you in cybersecurity
work?  Do a “getting started” tutorial to help others learn about it so that they can implement it for
themselves.
• Enabling Cybersecurity Professional Development: What do you do to find, train, and retain good
people?  How do you enable them to keep their skills fresh and growing?
• It would be great to get a session on approaches to building the cybersecurity workforce available to the
science community.
We strongly encourage proposals that address the 2015 Summit finding and recommendations: 
• Security budget strategy / budget & program effectiveness
• Project leadership/stakeholders risk accountability and responsibility
• Software assurance
More details on the recommendations can be found in the 2015 NSF summit 
report: http://hdl.handle.net/2022/20539 
Additionally, the following ideas might help you build a presentation idea around this year’s 
theme, or work the theme into your presentation’s topic: 
• Supply chain requirements
• What are your most valuable and/or sensitive data?
o What assets have you had the most trouble protecting?
o Where have you found the best resources?  For commodity technologies?  For your special
equipment?
• Have you gone through a process of formally identifying your information assets for security
purposes?  What does the documentation look like?  What challenges have you faced (e.g., in classifying
data)?
• Did you find anything assets that surprised you…. that you didn’t think of as critical to the integrity of the 
scientific results? 
• How do you assign responsibility for / stewardship of specific information assets (or sets of assets that
serve a process) within your organization?  When if ever does security have direct accountability for the
security of these assets?
How to Build a CFP Response 
The proposal you submit will be used in two ways: to tell the organizers about what you plan to 
present, and to be included in the summit findings as a sort of after-action report.  It should 
include: 
• An executive summary (short description of the topic and content).
• Who the presenter(s) is/are.
• Either a whitepaper discussion of the topic, or a narrative you’d like to share with the community.  (For
activities that are not trainings or plenary sessions, this may be replaced with a description of the planned
activity, any space or equipment needs, and the activity’s intended audience.)
• Contact information (preferably email) for the presenter(s) in case the organizers have any questions.  This
can be in a separate note in the email body instead of the proposal itself if presenter(s) don’t wish it to be
published.
• Expected length of the session/training/activity.  Generally, trainings are either full- or half-day and plenary
sessions are about 50 minutes, but if a good idea takes more time than that, we will work with presenters to
make it happen.
• Any relevant references (e.g. link to the home page for the project the talk is about, or recommendations for
further reading).
Our community has expressed in the past that many find it helpful if they can download a copy 
of a presentation’s slides.  If you are willing to publish your slides, please email a copy (or a link 
to where you prefer to host slides) to CFP@trustedci.org. 
The easiest way to get help/feedback from the organizing committee prior to submitting your 
final proposal is to create a Google Doc containing your proposal and sending an edit link 
to CFP@trustedci.org.  Don’t share directly with that address, as the link will be passed on to a 
reviewer who will have their own google account. 
Tips for Presenting 
There are many different presentation formats that can work well, depending on the 
topic.  Consider the following: 
Lecture format : The presenter(s) talk to the audience and show slides to support their dialogue, 
then do a short Q&A time at the end of the presentation. 
Panel format: 3-5 persons answer questions offered by a moderator on a specific topic or set of 
topics, then do a short Q&A with the audience.  This tends to work out best when the panel 
contains people with very different backgrounds or viewpoints, and the moderator is good at 
keeping folks to the topic and time constraints. 
Open Forum format: 2-3 persons answer questions offered by the audience.  Works best if 
there is an extra person gathering questions and presenting them, and if the speakers can keep 
things succinct so that the presentation keeps moving and many questions get answered. 
Hands-on format: The presenter(s) walk the audience through a demo or tutorial as the audience 
follows along on their computers (or on paper, if the topic supports it).  If you are doing a 
training that will have many hands-on activities, consider having more than one presenter, or a 
presenter plus a helper or two who can go around the room and help participants who get stuck, 
allowing the group as a whole to move on. 
Whatever format you choose, be sure to engage your audience by making eye contact (with 
them, not with the slide screen!), showing interest in what you are saying, and not rushing.  Most 
speakers appear most smooth and practiced when following a general outline they’ve practiced 
once or twice, rather than trying to read a prepared script verbatim. 
Appendix D 
Training Descriptions 
Training Sessions *August 16* 2016 NSF Cybersecurity Summit 
Tuesday, August 16 will feature a full day of training, available to all registrants. All but the Log Analysis Training 
with CTSC and Bro and Federated Identity Management for Research Organizations are half-day offerings. Seating 
may fill for some or all sessions, and pre-event registration for individual sessions is required to reserve a seat. 
Please register by August 11 to guarantee seating and help us make final preparations. Direct inquiries to Amy 
Starzynski Coddens (astarzyn@indiana.edu). 
Concurrent Morning Sessions 
Log Analysis Training with CTSC and Bro (Full Day) 
Instructors: Vlad Grigorescu, Warren Raquel, Adam Slagell, Jeannette Dopheide (NCSA) 
CTSC is partnering with members of the Bro Project to present a full-day training on log analysis for 
operations security, providing a detailed walkthrough of the log analysis life cycle with interactive 
demonstrations using the Bro network analysis software. The training will be applicable to those just 
starting or those expanding their security logging and monitoring infrastructure. No prior experience with 
Bro is required. The training will teach lessons that can be generalized to other kinds of system and 
network logs, whether or not a site is using or plans to use the Bro software. 
The goal of security log analysis is to more efficiently leverage log collection in order to identify threats 
and anomalies in their cyberinfrastructure. This training will help attendees tie various log and data sources 
together to provide a more rounded, coherent picture of a potential security event. It will also help attendees 
understand log analysis as a life cycle that continues to become more efficient over time. 
The training will cover the four phases of the log analysis life cycle: Monitoring, Event Management, 
Analysis, and Response. It will demonstrate how proper management of these four phases contributes to a 
security team's effectiveness. Interactive demonstrations will cover both automated and manual analysis 
using multiple log sources (network protocols, files, software, intel, etc.), with examples from real security 
incidents. Lastly, the training will cover how to use lessons learned during each cycle to tune the 
monitoring and analysis workflow to improve an organization's operational security footing over time. 
Federated Identity Management for Research Organizations (Full Day) 
Instructors: Jim Basney (NCSA and University of Illinois / CTSC) and Scott Koranda (Spherical Cow 
Group / CTSC) 
Research Organizations and Collaborations, and especially virtual organizations (VOs), come together to 
solve complex problems leveraging people and resources from multiple institutions, often spanning the 
world. Expert in their respective domains, VOs rarely have expertise in the identity management aspects of 
collaboration. Regardless of VO size, properly designed identity management processes and technologies 
can help facilitate VO research by providing access to collaboration tools and services quickly, and 
removing that access when it should no longer be granted. 
This full-day tutorial will provide an overview of the issues in identity management facing and solutions 
available to VOs, in order to help them more easily manage access to their resources. 
Topics covered will include: 
• Understanding the identity management process needs of VOs of any size
• Leveraging Federated and Social Identity to authenticate VO participants
• Understanding the complexities of international federation and collaboration
• Passwords, Certificates, SSH Keys, and other authentication technologies: what works where?
• Participant lifecycle management using open source identity management solutions, including
COmanage, Grouper, and Shibboleth
• Application Integration and Provisioning, from the shell to the web to the cloud: how to make
apps work with identity management infrastructure
Interactive demonstrations will be used to provide tangible insight into the capabilities of various solutions. 
REN-ISAC Cyberthreat Training (30 Minute Introduction to Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF 
Projects) 
 Instructors:  Kim Milford and Todd Herring (REN-ISAC) 
Cyber-attacks can be extremely damaging for research organizations. Damages - and costs - include stolen 
funds, damaged systems, the cost of time while out of service or time to recover, regulatory fines, legal 
damages, financial compensation for injured parties, loss of business partner trust, and loss of integrity due to 
compromised digital assets. Being resilient to cyber-risks starts with knowing about the risks to research and 
academic organizations: 
• What are the biggest threats?
• What assets are at greatest risk?
• What are the tactics, techniques and practices (TTPs) used by your adversaries?
• What are the possible scenarios for attack? and
• What is the potential impact to your research?
Insight into cyber-threats allows organizations to develop appropriate risk management and reduce risk 
exposure through well-balanced cyber-defense Although it's never possible for any organization to be 100% 
secure, it is entirely possible to use a mix of processes for prevention, detection, and response to keep cyber-
risk below an appropriate level and enable an organization to operate with less disruption. 
Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Projects 
 Instructors: Bob Cowles, Craig Jackson, Jim Marsteller, Susan Sons (CTSC) 
This instructional session will be based on a cybersecurity planning guide (see trustedci.org/guide) 
developed with input from the Daniel K. Inouye Solar Telescope (DKIST) project, and in use at a number of 
NSF facilities and projects. The Guide was developed to address the information security requirements 
outlined in NSF cooperative agreements, and provide solid guidance, tools, and resources. This session will 
be appropriate both for attendees of last year's training of the same name, as well as newcomers. Though 
there will be a good deal of overlap, we will be updating our presentation, and supporting opportunities to 
explore areas in greater depth based on participants' needs. Some of the topics that will be covered include: 
• Building or Improving an Information Security Program
• Unique and Critical Science Requirements, Constraints, and Security Controls
• Information Security Policies and Procedures
• The Role of Project Leadership and Risk Acceptance
• Establishing a Risk Management Approach to Information Security
• Defining, Identifying, and Classifying Information Assets
• The Role of Risk Assessments within the Program Lifecycle
• Baseline Controls and Best Practices
• Topical Information Security Considerations: Third-Party Relationships, Asset Management,
Access Control, Physical Security, Monitoring, Logging, and Retention
• Program Assessment and Evaluation
While this session will be instructional in nature, it is also intended to be an interactive session to seek 
constructive feedback from attendees to further improve the guide. There will be significant opportunities for 
discussion and Q&A. 
Building a NIST Risk Management Framework for HIPAA and FISMA Compliance 
 Instructor: Anurag Shankar (Indiana University) 
Every federal agency and its subcontractors are required by law to comply with the Federal Information 
Security Management Act (FISMA). With cyberattacks and cybercrime now an increasingly integral and 
permanent part of the cyber landscape, funding agencies are beginning to require FISMA compliance from 
their R&D subcontractors such as large facilities. In other cases, protected health information (PHI) subject 
to the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) is beginning to leak into 
organizations that handle for instance emerging areas such as genomics, big data and analytics. In both cases, 
the most formidable challenge when facing regulatory compliance for the first time is a complete lack of 
bearing. Often, peers cannot be easily found and a lonely and steep learning curve must be scaled. A 
common reaction in such cases is to reply on technical controls alone such as firewalls, etc. with the 
mistaken assumption that they will keep the bad actors out. Not carefully considering the effectiveness of 
controls in mitigating risk results in both inadequate security as well as misdirected effort.  
FISMA requires the adoption of cybersecurity guidelines developed by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST). NIST provides a comprehensive and flexible risk management framework that can 
be customized to fit any organization or environment, irrespective of FISMA. NIST also provides an all-
inclusive catalog of practically every conceivable security control to choose from. The NIST guidelines are 
also considered as a cybersecurity standard today and adopted by a wide variety of organization within and 
outside the government. They allow one to comply not only with FISMA but with other rules and regulations 
such as HIPAA. This workshop will familiarize the participant with both HIPAA and FISMA and provide 
guidance on how to build and deploy a NIST based risk management framework to both handle compliance 
and to gain a deeper understanding of cybersecurity and how to manage it.  
Topics Covered: 
• HIPAA and FISMA Regulations: An introduction to the regulations, common misperceptions,
where and how they apply.
• The NIST Risk Management Framework. A dive into risk management and security controls
covered by NIST special publications 800-30 and 800-53.
• Building Your Own Risk Management Framework. Scoping, planning, controls, initial risk
assessment, risk mitigation, documentation, ongoing risk management, reviews and training.
Secure Coding Practices and Automated Assessment Tools 
 Instructors:  Prof. Barton P. Miller and Prof. Elisa Heymann (University of Wisconsin /  CTSC) 
This tutorial is relevant to anyone wanting to learn about minimizing security flaws in the software they 
develop or manage. We share our experiences gained from performing vulnerability assessments of critical 
middleware. You will learn skills critical for software developers and analysts concerned with security.  
Software assurance tools - tools that scan the source or binary code of a program to find weaknesses - are the 
first line of defense in assessing the security of a software project. These tools can catch flaws in a program 
that can affect both the correctness and safety of the code. This tutorial is also relevant to anyone wanting to 
learn how to use these automated assessment tools to minimize security flaws in the software they develop or 
manage.  
This tutorial starts by presenting basic concepts related to threats, weaknesses and vulnerabilities. We will 
also show how to think like an attacker. Then we will present coding practices that lead to vulnerabilities, 
with examples of how they commonly arise, techniques to prevent them, and exercises to reinforce your 
skills in avoiding them. Examples come from a wide variety of languages, including Java, C, C++, C#, Perl, 
Pythos, and Ruby, and come from real code belonging to Cloud and Grid systems we have assessed. The 
new addition to the tutorial covers software assurance tools work, so that the student can understand the 
capabilities and limitations of such tools. We then focus on a selection of both commercial and open source 
tools for C/C++ and Java, and demonstrate how to apply them to sample programs with known flaws. 
Concurrent Afternoon Sessions 
Log Analysis Training with CTSC and Bro (continued) 
See full description above. 
Federated Identity Management for Research Organizations (continued) 
    See full description above. 
Securing Legacy Industrial Control Systems 
Instructor: Phil Salkie (Jenariah Industrial Automation) 
Scientific and technical facilities worldwide incorporate Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems into their mix of technologies - often without 
the knowledge or support of the on-side IT department. These systems can include decades-old designs, 
contain firmware which is not (or cannot) be updated or patched, and can have long lists of known 
vulnerabilities - yet they continue to be placed into network environments throughout the world. This 
breakout session will explore a range of devices and techniques which are available to IT departments and 
network engineers to isolate, monitor, and protect these often mission-critical Industrial Control System 
(ICS) networks without replacing older devices nor obtaining access from vendors to proprietary controller 
software. 
Building the Modern Research Data Portal Using the Globus Platform 
Instructor: Steve Tuecke (University of Chicago) 
New Globus REST APIs, combined with high-speed networks and Science DMZs, create a research data 
platform on which developers can create entirely new classes of scientific applications, portals, and 
gateways. Globus is an established service that is widely used for managing research data on XSEDE, DOE, 
and campus computing resources, and it continues to evolve with the addition of data publication 
capabilities, and enhancement of the core data transfer and sharing functions. Over the past year we have 
added new identity and access management functionality that will simplify access to Globus using campus 
logins, and facilitate the integration of Globus, XSEDE, and other research cyberinfrastructure services into 
web and mobile applications can leverage Globus and Science DMZs to provide a broad range of researchers 
with access to advanced data management capabilities using existing organizational credentials. A 
combination of presentation and hands-on exercises will result in attendees learning how to build and run a 
simple, yet fully functional, web application that can be leveraged their own applications. 
Secure Software Engineering Best Practices 
 Instructors: Randy Heiland and Susan Sons (CTSC) 
This interactive training session will introduce participants to a broad range of tools and methodologies for 
promoting secure software development throughout the software life cycle. Learn how software repositories, 
testing, static analysis, vulnerability management process, release/delivery management methods, integrated 
development environments (IDEs), and documentation can enhance or impair the security of the software 
that is written and released by any team. Participants are encouraged to follow along on their laptops for the 
most hands-on experience, but this is not required. 
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Your Name Your Organization / Institution 
Abe Singer NERSC, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 
Adam Slagell NCSA 
Alexander Withers NCSA 
Amy Starzynski Coddens CACR/Indiana University 
Amy Walton Advanced Cyberinfrastructure Division, National Science Foundation 
Andrew Ferbert San Diego Supercomputer Center 
Andrew Gallo The George Washington University 
Andrew K Adams CTSC 
Anita Nikolich NSF 
Anthony Skjellum Auburn University 
Anurag Shankar Indiana University 
Ardoth Hassler Georgetown University 
Aunshul Rege Temple University 
Barb Fossum BMF Consulting 
Barton Miller University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Bill Miller National Science Foundation 
Bob Cowles CTSC / BtightLite Info Sec 
Bob Houtman NSF 
Bret Goodrich National Solar Observatory 
Brian Markham The George Washington University 
Cesar Flores IODP, TAMU 
Chris Morrison Gemini Observatory 
Christopher Thompson Purdue University 
Cliff Jacobs Clifford A. Jacobs Consulting LLC 
Craig Jackson CTSC / Indiana University CACR 
Dave Dykstra Fermilab 
David Goodwin U.S. Dept of Energy 
David Halstead National Radio Astronomy Observatory 
Deja T. Jackon Kennesaw State University 
Diana Borecky CACR 
Diane Murphy Marymount University 
Dominique Dalanni California State University, Dominguez Hills 
Your Name Your Organization / Institution 
Don DuRousseau George Washington University 
Doug Pearson REN-ISAC 
Elisa Heymann University of Wisconsin-Madison 
George Strawn National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine 
Irene Qualters NSF 
James Babcock Hughes Cerro Tololo Interamerican Observatory 
James Marsteller Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center 
Jamie Allan National Science Foundation 
Jeannette Dopheide CTSC 
Jeff Leithead NSF 
Jim Basney NCSA 
Jim Rosser Texas A&M University 
Joy Pauschke National Science Foundation ENG/CMMI 
JUAN F. Arratia Ana G. Mendez University System, San Juan, Puerto Rico 
Justin Platt Northern Virginia Community College 
Justin R. Davis University of Florida 
Keith Hartranft Lehigh University 
Kevin Thompson NSF 
Kimberly Milford REN-ISAC 
Larry Wallace Caltech 
Leslee Cooper CACR 
Mark Coles National Science Foundation 
Mark Krenz CTSC / CACR 
Mark Patton University of Arizona - Management Information Systems 
Michael Corn Brandeis University 
Michael Sinatra Energy Sciences Network 
Miron Livny University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Nathaniel Mendoza TACC/UT 
Nikita Golubets Eastern Michigan University 
Nino Simonishvili National Cybersecurity Institute at Excelsior College 
Noor Aarohi The George Washington University 
Patricia Okorie Prince George's Community College 
Your Name Your Organization / Institution 
Patrick Murphy National Radio Astronomy Observatory 
Patrick Storm Texas Advanced Computing Center 
Peter Jensen Florida State University 
Peter Kuper In-Q-Tel 
Phil Salkie Jenariah Industrial Automation 
Purushotham Bangalore University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB) 
Ragib Hasan University of Alabama at Birmingham 
Randy Heiland CACR/Indiana University 
Raphael Greenbaum Wall of Wind, Florida International University 
Rasib Khan University of Alabama at Birmingham 
Robert Kent NHERI UTexas 
Rod Rutland National Optical Astronomy Observatory 
RuthAnne Bevier Caltech 
Ryan Kiser Indiana University CACR 
Ryan L. Richmond AURA 
Scott Koranda Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure 
Shannon Roddy Penn State 
Shijie Yang The Cornell High Energy Synchrotron Source / Cornell University 
Steve Barnet UW-Madison 
Steve Cleveland Oregon State University 
Steve Tuecke Globus / UChicago / Argonne 
Steven Geiger National Radio Astronomy Observatory 
Susan Ramsey NCAR - National Center for Atmospheric Research 
Susan Sons CACR, Indiana University 
Taína Muñoz-Mulero National Science Foundation 
Terry Fleury Univ. of Illinois / NCSA 
Tim Howard National Science Foundation 
Tim Minick HPM 
Tony Baylis Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
Vic Thomas BBN Technologies 
Victor Hazlewood University of Tennessee 
Vitaly Ford Tennessee Tech University 
Your Name Your Organization / Institution 
Vlad Grigorescu NCSA 
Von Welch CACR / Indiana University 
Warren Raquel CTSC 
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38.10% 16
4.76% 2
42.86% 18
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2.38% 1
11.90% 5
Q1 Which options best describe your job or
position? Check all that apply.
Answered: 42 Skipped: 0
Total Respondents: 42
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leader of an...
NSF Program
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Campus IT
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Cybersecurity
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Personnel from
another fede...
Other
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NSF Program Officer
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Cybersecurity Researcher
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Q2 Where do you work primarily?
Answered: 42 Skipped: 0
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State/Province:
Country:
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40.48% 17
33.33% 14
38.10% 16
16.67% 7
Q3 How would you characterize your job in
relationship to cybersecurity? Please check
all that apply.
Answered: 42 Skipped: 0
Total Respondents: 42
I am a
cybersecurit...
I am a
technical...
I have
management...
Other (please
specify)
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Answer Choices Responses
I am a cybersecurity professional
I am a technical professional who has knowledge of cybersecurity
I have management responsibility for cybersecurity
Other (please specify)
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23.81% 10
9.52% 4
21.43% 9
11.90% 5
4.76% 2
9.52% 4
4.76% 2
Q4 What sessions of the summit did you
attend? Check all that apply.
Answered: 42 Skipped: 0
Day 1
Morning:Log...
Day 1
Morning:Fede...
Day 1
Morning:REN-...
Day 1
Morning:Buil...
Day 1 Morning:
Secure Codin...
Day 1
Afternoon: L...
Day 1
Afternoon:...
Day 1
Afternoon:Se...
Day 1
Afternoon:Bu...
Day 1
Afternoon:...
Day 2 (Aug
18): Plenary...
Day 3 (Aug
19): Plenary...
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Answer Choices Responses
Day 1 Morning:Log Analysis Training with CTSC and Bro
Day 1 Morning:Federated Identity Management for Research Organizations
Day 1 Morning:REN-ISAC Cyberthreat Training / Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Projects
Day 1 Morning:Building a NIST Risk Management Framework for HIPAA and FISMA Compliance
Day 1 Morning: Secure Coding Practices and Automated Assessment Tools
Day 1 Afternoon: Log Analysis Training with CTSC and Bro(continued)
Day 1 Afternoon: Federated Identity Management for Research Organizations(continued)
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19.05% 8
4.76% 2
9.52% 4
61.90% 26
52.38% 22
Total Respondents: 42
Day 1 Afternoon:Securing Legacy Industrial Control Systems
Day 1 Afternoon:Building the Modern Research Data Portal Using the Globus Platform
Day 1 Afternoon: Secure Software Engineering Best Practices
Day 2 (Aug 18): Plenary Session
Day 3 (Aug 19): Plenary Session
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59.52% 25
38.10% 16
2.38% 1
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0.00% 0
Q5 How would you rate your overall
experience with the 2016 summit?
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Q6 Please rate your experience with the
2016 summit in these areas:
Answered: 42 Skipped: 0
Topics
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Presentations
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Organization
Venue
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4.76% 2
35.71% 15
19.05% 8
35.71% 15
4.76% 2
0.00% 0
0.00% 0
Q7 Was this summit better than what you
expected, worse than what you expected, or
about what you expected?
Answered: 42 Skipped: 0
Total 42
A great deal
better
Quite a bit
better
Somewhat better
About what was
expected
Somewhat worse
Quite a bit
worse
A great deal
worse
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Answer Choices Responses
A great deal better
Quite a bit better
Somewhat better
About what was expected
Somewhat worse
Quite a bit worse
A great deal worse
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33.33% 14
47.62% 20
19.05% 8
0.00% 0
0.00% 0
Q8 How useful to your work was the
information discussed at the summit?
Answered: 42 Skipped: 0
Total 42
Extremely
useful
Very useful
Moderately
useful
Slightly useful
Not at all
useful
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Extremely useful
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2.50% 1
30.00% 12
22.50% 9
0.00% 0
2.50% 1
42.50% 17
Q9 If you attended last year's summit, how
does this year's compare?
Answered: 40 Skipped: 2
Total 40
This year's
summit was m...
This year's
summit was...
This year's
summit was...
This year's
summit was...
This year's
summit was m...
I did not
attend last...
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Answer Choices Responses
This year's summit was much better than last year's.
This year's summit was better than last year's.
This year's summit was about the same as last year's.
This year's summit was worse than last year's.
This year's summit was much worse than last year's.
I did not attend last year's summit.
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2.38% 1
23.81% 10
73.81% 31
0.00% 0
0.00% 0
Q10 How would you describe the balance
between structured presentations and
informal networking opportunities?
Answered: 42 Skipped: 0
Total 42
Much too
little time ...
Too little
time for...
About the
right balance
Too little
time for...
Much too
little time ...
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Answer Choices Responses
Much too little time for informal networking
Too little time for informal networking
About the right balance
Too little time for structured presentations
Much too little time for structured presentations
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92.86% 39
4.76% 2
2.38% 1
Q11 Would you like to attend future
summits?
Answered: 42 Skipped: 0
Total 42
Yes
Maybe
No
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Answer Choices Responses
Yes
Maybe
No
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52.50% 21
65.00% 26
40.00% 16
60.00% 24
2.50% 1
57.50% 23
Q12 What presentation format(s) did you
find most valuable? (You may select more
than one.)
Answered: 40 Skipped: 2
Total Respondents: 40
Plenary Keynote
Plenary Case
Studies
Plenary Panels
Day 1 Training
Day 2 Lunch
Table Topics
General
Opportunitie...
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Answer Choices Responses
Plenary Keynote
Plenary Case Studies
Plenary Panels
Day 1 Training
Day 2 Lunch Table Topics
General Opportunities to Network
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41.67% 10
33.33% 8
37.50% 9
16.67% 4
Q2 How would you characterize your job in
relationship to cybersecurity? Please check
all that apply.
Answered: 24 Skipped: 0
Total Respondents: 24
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cybersecurit...
I am a
technical...
I have
management...
Other (please
specify)
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Answer Choices Responses
I am a cybersecurity professional
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I have management responsibility for cybersecurity
Other (please specify)
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91.67% 22
8.33% 2
0.00% 0
Q3 Based on your overall experience with
the August 16 training sessions, would you
participate in training offered at future
summits?
Answered: 24 Skipped: 0
Total 24
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29.17% 7
16.67% 4
29.17% 7
8.33% 2
12.50% 3
4.17% 1
Q5 Which morning session did you attend?
Answered: 24 Skipped: 0
Total 24
Log Analysis
Training wit...
Federated
Identity...
REN-ISAC
Cyberthreat...
Building a
NIST Risk...
Secure Coding
Practices an...
I did not
attend a...
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Answer Choices Responses
Log Analysis Training with CTSC and Bro (Vlad Grigorescu, Warren Raquel, Adam Slagell, Jeannette Dopheide)
Federated Identity Management for Research Organizations (Jim Basney & Scott Koranda)
REN-ISAC Cyberthreat Training (Kim Milford & Todd Herring) / Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Projects (CTSC TEAM)
Building a NIST Risk Management Framework for HIPAA and FISMA Compliance (Anurag Shankar)
Secure Coding Practices and Automated Assessment Tools (Barton P. Miller & Elisa Heymann)
I did not attend a morning session
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34.78% 8
52.17% 12
13.04% 3
Q6 How would you rate your level of pre-
training familiarity with the topics covered
by this morning training session?
Answered: 23 Skipped: 1
Total 23
Novice
Intermediate
Expert
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Answer Choices Responses
Novice
Intermediate
Expert
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47.83% 11
43.48% 10
4.35% 1
4.35% 1
0.00% 0
Q7 How would you rate your overall
experience with the morning training?
Answered: 23 Skipped: 1
Total 23
Excellent
Good
Average
Below Average
Poor
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Answer Choices Responses
Excellent
Good
Average
Below Average
Poor
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Q8 Please rate your experience with the
morning training in these areas:
Answered: 23 Skipped: 1
Quality of
Presentation
Speakers'
Expertise
Organization
of Content
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4.35%
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4.35%
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5
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8.70% 2
30.43% 7
21.74% 5
30.43% 7
4.35% 1
4.35% 1
0.00% 0
Q9 Was this morning training better than
what you expected, worse than what you
expected, or about what you expected?
Answered: 23 Skipped: 1
Total 23
A great deal
better
Quite a bit
better
Somewhat better
About what was
expected
Somewhat worse
Quite a bit
worse
A great deal
worse
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Somewhat better
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Somewhat worse
Quite a bit worse
A great deal worse
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30.43% 7
39.13% 9
21.74% 5
8.70% 2
0.00% 0
Q10 How useful to your work was this
morning training?
Answered: 23 Skipped: 1
Total 23
Extremely
useful
Very useful
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Slightly useful
Not at all
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20.83% 5
16.67% 4
33.33% 8
12.50% 3
12.50% 3
4.17% 1
Q13 Which afternoon session did you
attend?
Answered: 24 Skipped: 0
Total 24
Log Analysis
Training wit...
Federated
Identity...
Securing
Legacy...
Building the
Modern Resea...
Secure
Software...
I did not
attend an...
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Answer Choices Responses
Log Analysis Training with CTSC and Bro (Vlad Grigorescu, Warren Raquel, Adam Slagell, Jeannette Dopheide)
Federated Identity Management for Research Organizations (Jim Basney & Scott Koranda)
Securing Legacy Industrial Control Systems (Phil Salkie)
Building the Modern Research Data Portal Using the Globus Platform (Steve Tuecke)
Secure Software Engineering Best Practices (Randy Heiland & Susan Sons)
I did not attend an afternoon session
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54.55% 12
36.36% 8
9.09% 2
Q14 How would you rate your level of pre-
training familiarity with the topics covered
by this afternoon training session?
Answered: 22 Skipped: 2
Total 22
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Intermediate
Expert
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Answer Choices Responses
Novice
Intermediate
Expert
15 / 22
Training Evaluation | 2016 NSF Cybersecurity Summit SurveyMonkey
54.55% 12
36.36% 8
4.55% 1
4.55% 1
0.00% 0
Q15 How would you rate your overall
experience with the afternoon training?
Answered: 22 Skipped: 2
Total 22
Excellent
Good
Average
Below Average
Poor
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Answer Choices Responses
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Good
Average
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Q16 Please rate your experience with the
afternoon training in these areas:
Answered: 22 Skipped: 2
Quality of
Presentation
Speakers'
Expertise
Organization
of Content
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40.91% 9
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27.27% 6
4.55% 1
0.00% 0
0.00% 0
Q17 Was this afternoon training session
better than what you expected, worse than
what you expected, or about what you
expected?
Answered: 22 Skipped: 2
Total 22
A great deal
better
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better
Somewhat better
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expected
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Quite a bit
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A great deal
worse
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A great deal better
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Somewhat better
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27.27% 6
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13.64% 3
9.09% 2
4.55% 1
Q18 How useful to your work was this
afternoon training?
Answered: 22 Skipped: 2
Total 22
Extremely
useful
Very useful
Moderately
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Slightly useful
Not at all
useful
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Answer Choices Responses
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Not at all useful
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Submitted White Papers / CFP Responses 
A	Secure	Optical	Fusion	and	Received-Signal-Strength-Indicator	(RSSI)																
Approach	for	Threat	Detection	in	Large	Facilities	
	
Kaiqi	Xiong		
Florida	Center	for	Cybersecurity		
University	of	South	Florida		
Tampa,	FL	33620	USA	
	
Security	and	terrorist	attacks	have	become	prominent	concerns	in	the	nation.	Potential	“soft	targets”	include	hospitals,	
schools,	retail	malls,	transit	systems,	amusement	parks	and	sport	arenas,	in	addition	to	military	facilities,	e.g.,	recent	
terrorism	attacks	at	the	Brussels	Airport	in	Belgium.	The	nature	of	these	targets	makes	them	very	vulnerable.	Target	
tracking	through	distributed	camera	systems	is	fundamental	in	video	and	sensing	surveillance	and	it	presents	a	grand	
challenge	in	maintaining	the	identification	and	directionality	of	the	target.	Many	approaches	have	been	researched	to	
address	the	directionality	and	maintenance	of	the	tracking	system	including	track-to-track	fusion.	A	major	challenge	in	
tracking	systems	through	cameras	is	when	the	target	of	interest	moves	outside	of	the	field-of-view	(FOV)	due	to	
obscurity.	To	maintain	video	tracking,	researchers	have	mainly	suggested	two	approaches.		
• Estimation	techniques	such	as	nonlinear	Kalman	filters	and	unscented	filters	have	been	used	to	retain	the	track	of	
the	target	of	interest.	However,	such	tracking	may	be	very	inaccurate	when	the	target	of	interest	is	an	
intruder.			
• Wi-Fi	enabled	device	tracking	through	Received-Signal-Strength-Indicator	(RSSI)	is	also	proposed	to	track	the	target	
of	interest.	However,	Wi-Fi	tracking	poses	a	challenge	as	environmental	factors	can	distort	the	signal	strength	
and	sensors	have	computing	and	storage	constraints.	These	influences	create	ambiguous	results	that	are	
mixed	with	various	security	attacks	to	inaccurate	location.		We	have	recently	addressed	the	above	challenges	
on	the	nonlinear	target	tracking	for	threat	detection	where	some	collected	data	are	altered	by	intruders	
through	various	security	attacks	that	may	include:	(1)	the	interest	of	target	is	an	intruder,	(2)	the	part	of	
sensor	nodes	is	compromised	by	intruders,	and	(3)	some	collected	data	are	altered	during	data	transmissions.	
Specifically,	the	objective	of	this	presentation	is	to	share	our	development	of	an	efficient	and	attack-resilient	
multiple-target	tracking	framework	for	threat	detection	in	urban	surveillance	by	using	the	Dynamic	Data-	
Driven	Application	Systems	(DDDAS)-based	approach	under	computing	and	storage	constraints.		The	DDDAS-
based	attack-resilient	framework	consists	of	two	components:	(1)	attack-	resilient	multiple-target	tracking	
pre-processing	and	delay-guaranteed	communications	by	using	optical	fusion	and	RSSI,	and	(2)	DDDAS-based	
decision	making	for	threat	detection	by	developing	attack-resilient	filtering	techniques	into	dynamic	data	
analysis.	The	DDDAS-based	attack-resilient	framework	with	resulting	algorithms	will	be	evaluated	on	the	
Global	Environment	for	Network	Innovations	(GENI)	infrastructure,			
sponsored	by	National	Science	Foundation	(NSF).	This	research	aims	to	build	security	solutions	for	threat	detection	in	
national	critical	large	facilities.	City-scale	deployment	will	place	greater	demands	also	on	the	usability	of	the	security	
solutions.		
Interest	of	Attendance		
Dr.	Xiong	would	like	to	take	the	opportunity	to	share	his	above	research	experience	with	attendees,	learn	the	state	of	
the	arts	in	large	facility	security	from	other	attendees,	and,	in	particular,	explore	the	potential	to	collaborate	with	
other	researchers	in	the	field.		
Brief	Bio		
Dr.	Xiong	is	currently	an	Associate	Professor	at	the	University	of	South	Florida.	Before	returning	to	academia,	he	has	
worked	in	IT	industry	for	several	years	where	he	received	the	Invention	Achievement	Award,	the	Publication	Award	
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Abstract		
A	common	starting	point	for	organizational	budgeting	is	benchmarking	research.	These	studies	
effectively	answer	the	question:	“What	are	the	Johnson’s	doing?”	We	have	conducted	an	exhaustive	
review	and	analysis	of	cybersecurity	budgeting	benchmark	research	(including	more	than	50	studies).	
This	paper	offers	a	bird’s	eye	view	analysis	of	the	available	research	and	its	quality,	and	provides	
recommendations	to	organizations	on	whether	and	how	to	utilize	this	research	as	well	as	
recommendations	for	improving	future	research.		
	
1	Introduction		
We	set	out	to	identify	research	studying	quantitative	metrics	that	can	be	employed	to	assess	an	
organization’s	cybersecurity	program,	beginning	with	the	most	readily	available	and	logical	metric	to	
follow:	money.	Specifically,	how	much	money	do	organizations	spend	on	cybersecurity?	Spending	is	a	
concrete	number;	it	theoretically	correlates	with	improved	security;	and	it	is	comparatively	easy	to	
study	in	a	domain	where	usable	metrics	seem	to	elude	our	grasp.	Perhaps	most	importantly,	board	
members	and	C-suite	officers	understand	money,	which	often	cannot	be	said	for	more	complex	
methods	for	testing	security.	Despite	the	seemingly	straightforward	nature	of	this	question,	our	
analysis	found	the	state	of	the	cybersecurity	budget	research	sorely	lacking.	Information	relating	to	
cybersecurity	budgets	is	rarely	presented	in	a	verifiable	and	actionable	manner,	and	even	when	
presented	as	such,	cybersecurity	budgets	contain	a	host	of	complexities	that	must	be	understood	and	
addressed	for	the	data	to	be	practically	implemented.		
	
2	Methodology		
To	conduct	our	review	we	queried	for	research	returning	a	combination	of	the	words	“cyber,”	“IT,”	
“network,”	or	“information”	and	“security”1	with	“spending”	and/or	“budget.”	Based	on	these	results,	
we	conducted	a	preliminary	analysis	of	the	studies	presented,	looking	for	independent	reviews	that	
collected	and	analyzed	new	data	(as	opposed	to	reporting	other	work),	or	those	that	compiled	
research	found	in	other	sources.	Among	those	sources,	we	then	narrowed	the	pool	based	on	select	
criteria,		
	
	
	
1	This	included	obvious	variations,	such	as	hyphenations,	so	the	term	“cybersecurity”	would	also	warrant	“cyber	security”	
and	“cyber-security.”	For	completeness,	we	also	included	redundant	terms,	such	as	“IT	cybersecurity”	and	“network	
cybersecurity.”		
specified	in	the	following	subsections,	which	we	felt	necessary	to	provide	a	usable	sample	set	of	studies.	2		
	
2.1	Quantitative	Research		
The	primary	criterion	was	the	presence	of	at	least	one	quantitative	metric	for	assessing	organizational	
cybersecurity	spending.	This	primarily	was	satisfied	by	studies	assessing	cybersecurity	spending	as	a	
percentage	of	total	IT	budget,	as	a	percentage	of	total	revenue,	or	as	a	dollar	amount.	We	excluded	
surveys	asking	solely	whether	companies’	cybersecurity	spending	was	“increasing,	decreasing,	or	
remaining	the	same.”	Although	arguably	quantitative,	this	information	is	of	little	direct	use	without	a	
reference	point	for	from	what	baseline	the	budget	is	increasing	or	decreasing,3	and	without	discussion	
of	how	the	budget	was	quantified.4	We	also	excluded	research	that	quantified	or	forecasted	the	
“cybersecurity	market”	generally,	without	new	data	about	the	specific	spending	practices	of	
organizations.		
	
2.2	Published	Methodology		
We	excluded	studies	that	did	not	publish	their	methodology,	as	this	prevented	our	effective	
assessment	of	the	study’s	veracity.	This	therefore	excluded	private	studies	for	which	press	releases	
announced	findings,	but	which	are	not	made	fully	available,	as	these	results	present	insufficient	
information	to	assess	methodology.		
	
2.3	Publicly	Available		
This	review	is	limited	to	studies	that	are	publicly	available	or	available	through	the	services	provided	
by	a	typical	university	library.5	This	includes	research	that	is	only	made	available	after	providing	an	
email	or	other	contact	information,	but	does	not	include	any	research	that	requires	payment	or	the	
production	of	a	credit	card	number	to	access.		
	
2.4	Time	Period		
Finally,	this	review	is	limited	to	studies	published	between	January	2011	and	February	2016.	For	
reviews	that	are	conducted	yearly,	we	limited	our	analysis	to	the	most	recently	published	version	of	
each	yearly	review.6		
	
	
	
	
	
	
2	For	our	purposes,	we	excluded	budgetary	analyses	of	national	budgets,	as	well	as	the	budgets	of	international	bodies	like	
the	European	Union.	3	An	increasing	budget	may	reflect	inadequate	spending	in	previous	years,	whereas	a	decreasing	
budget	may	represent	overspending.		
4	An	“increasing”	budget	represented	in	dollars	may	be	a	static	budget	as	a	percentage	of	IT	budget,	reflecting	overall	
growth	of	the	company	or	adjustment	for	inflation,	whereas	a	shift	in	budget	as	a	percentage	of	IT	budget	cannot	be	
properly	interpreted	without	inclusion	of	any	shifts	in	the	total	IT	budget.	A	decreasing	IT	budget	coupled	with	a	
proportionately	smaller	decrease	in	cybersecurity	spending	would	manifest	as	an	increasing	cybersecurity	budget	as	a	
percentage	of	IT	budget.		
5	Our	research	included	studies	obtained	through	the	Indiana	University	Library	system.	6	The	reasons	for	this	were	
twofold:	first,	the	most	recently	published	review	is	often	the	only	one	made	available	by	these	research	firms,	making	
that	data	the	most	applicable	to	what	a	private	company	would	be	able	to	find;	second,	inclusion	of	each	yearly	study	
would	skew	the	overall	data	towards	the	research	methods	of	the	firms	that	conduct	yearly	reviews,	and	diminish	the	
relative	weight	of	non-annual	reviews.		
3	Results		
Relying	upon	the	above	criteria,	we	collected	over	50	studies	presenting	independently	gathered	data.	
We	then	narrowed	the	pool	to	11	surveys	which	met	all	of	the	criteria	specified,	of	which	8	
represented	broad	spectrum	reviews,	and	3	represented	sector-specific	reviews.	Of	the	5	studies	that	
quantified	spending	as	a	percentage	of	IT	budget,	the	results	suggest	that	the	majority	of	budgets	lie	
within	the	range	of	3%	and	12%	of	IT	budget,	with	3.8%	[PWC],7	8.2%	[Ponemon/Dell],8	5.1%	
[Gartner],9	7.5%	[Wisegate],10	and	12%	[CIO	Magazine]11	as	the	reported	global	averages.12	Three	
additional	studies	did	not	provide	a	global	average,	instead	opting	to	present	solely	a	graphical	
overview	of	all	data	collected,	providing	spending	ranges	as	a	percentage	of	IT	Budget	
[SANS]13[EMC],14	and	as	dollar	amounts	[EY].15	Considering	that	each	of	these	studies	defaults	toward	
presenting	their	data	as	an	overall	average,	greater	subdivision	based	upon	important	factors,	such	as	
sector	and	size,	may	indicate	an	even	larger	range	of	2%-14%.	Below,	we	discuss	this	in	greater	detail.		
With	regard	to	organizational	size,16	Wisegate	found	that	the	average	cybersecurity	budget	for	small	
companies	was	10%	of	IT	budget,	whereas	the	average	budget	for	large	companies	was	only	4%	of	IT	
Budget.17	PWC	similarly	acknowledged	the	importance	of	organizational	size	as	a	factor	in	
cybersecurity	budgets,	although	in-depth	analysis	was	only	provided	for	the	“Finance”	sector,	where	
small	organizations	averaged	14.7%	of	IT	Budget,	as	compared	with	3.7%	for	large	organizations.18	
SANS	also	found	a	strong	influence	of	organization	size	on	budget,	showing	a	trend	of	increased		
	
	
	
	
	
	
7	[PWC]	"The	Global	State	of	Information	Security®	Survey	2015",	PwC,	2015.	[Online].	Available:	
http://www.pwccn.com/home/eng/rcs_info_security_2015.html.	Accessed	on:	Jun.	10,	2016.	8	[Dell]"2015	Global	IT	
Security	Spending	&	Investments	Report",	Dell,	2015.	[Online].	Available:	
http://www.dell.com/learn/us/en/uscorp1/press-releases/2015-06-08-dell-secureworks-and-ponemon-institute.	Accessed	
on:	Jun.	10,	2016.		
9	[Gartner]"Don't	Be	the	Next	Target	-	IT	Security	Spending	Priorities	2014",	Gartner,	2015.	[Online].	Available:	
http://www.gartner.com/document/2703221?ref=TypeAheadSearch&qid=5dbf48ee96bb217914bff14d0927e39e.	
Accessed	on:	Jun.	10,	2016.	10	[Wisegate]	M.	Zainach,	“2013	IT	Security	Benchmark	Report,”	Wisegate.	2013.	[Online].	
Available:	
http://wisegateit.com/resources/downloads/wisegate-security-benchmark-report.pdf?_ga=1.104382208.16370831	
32.1434031731.	Accessed	on:	Jun.	10,	2016.		
11	[CIO]	“2016	State	of	the	CIO”,	CIO,	2016.	[Online].	Available:	
http://core0.staticworld.net/assets/2016/01/14/2016-state-of-the-cio-executive-summary.pdf.	Accessed	on:	Jun.	10,	
2016.	12	This	does	not	include	respondents	who	selected	“Unsure.”	13	[SANS]	B.	Filkins,	“IT	Security	Spending	Trends,”	
SANS,	2016.	[Online].	Available:	
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/security-spending-trends-36697.	Accessed	on:	Jun.	10,	2016.	14	
[EMC]	"IT	Security	Survey	2014",	EMC.	2014.	[Online].	Available:	
http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=139455&Itemid=2926.	Accessed	on:	Jun.	10,	
2016.	15	[EY]	"Global	Information	Security	Survey	2014",	EY,	2015.	[Online].	Available:	
http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Advisory/EY-global-information-security-survey-2014.	Accessed	on:Jun.	10,	2016.	16	
The	exact	definitions	of	“large,”	“medium,”	and	“small”	companies,	or	their	relevant	analogues,	varied	across	the	
studies.	17	See,	[Wisegate]	supra.	18	See,	[PWC]	supra.		
security	budgets	as	a	percentage	of	IT	budgets	for	smaller	organizations.19	Similar	trends	in	other	
sectors	can	be	identified	through	data	exploration	tools	provided	by	PWC	and	EY.		
With	regard	to	sector,	Wisegate	showed	substantial	variation	in	spending	based	on	sector,	ranging	
from	10.4%	in	“Banking	and	Financial	Services”	to	2.3%	in	“Government,”	despite	a	global	average	of	
7.5%.	20	Similarly,	PWC	found	spending	ranging	from	3.7%	with	“Healthcare,	Retail,	and	Technology,”	
up	to	6.9%	with	“Industrial	Products.”21	E&Y,	while	not	providing	in-depth	analysis,	provides	access	to	
the	raw	data,	differentiated	by	sector,	which	further	suggests	considerable	sector-specific	variations	
in	spending.22	In	a	sector-specific	study,	SANS	found	that	cybersecurity	spending	in	the	“Healthcare”	
sector	was	1-3%	of	IT	budget	for	15%	of	respondents,	with	slightly	less	than	10%	spending	more	than	
10%	of	IT	budget,	and	slightly	over	10%	spending	less	than	1%	of	IT	budget.232425		
	
4	Analysis		
	
4.1	Overview		
Based	on	the	foregoing,	we	can	conclude	that	the	research	suggests	a	great	deal	of	variability	in	
cybersecurity	budgeting,	both	within	studies	and	between	studies,	and	that	greater	subdivision	of	the	
data	based	upon	sector,	size,	and	other	variables	is	appropriate	to	derive	meaningful	results.	While	
the	global	averages	identified	in	each	of	the	studies	lay	broadly	in	the	range	of	3%	and	12%	of	IT	
budget,	the	large	variability	in	the	findings	coupled	with	the	lack	of	a	clearly	stated	standard	deviation	
make	drawing	any	strong	conclusion	from	these	values	ill-advised.	Despite	this	variability	in	global	
averages,	the	research	does	suggest	that	sector	and	size	have	a	strong	influence	on	cybersecurity	
budgets,	warranting	more	in-depth	analysis.		
	
4.2	Organizational	Size		
Our	research	suggests	that	organizational	size	has	a	notable	impact	on	cybersecurity	budgets.26	Each	
of	the	non-excluded	studies	that	differentiated	the	data	based	on	organization	size	identified	a	trend	
toward	proportionate	reductions	in	spending	with	increasing	size.	Although	the	delineation	of	sizes	
varied	among		
	
	
	
19	See,	[SANS]	supra.	20	See,	[Wisegate]	supra.	21	See,	[PWC]	supra.	22	See,	[EY]	supra.	23	B.	Filkins,	“New	Threats	Drive	
Improved	Practices:	State	of	Cybersecurity	in	Health	Care	Organizations”,	SANS.	2014.	[Online].	Available:	
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/threats-drive-improved-practices-state-cybersecurity-healt	
h-care-organizations-35652.	Accessed:	Jun.	10,	2016.	24	Note,	however,	that	47%	were	unsure	of	their	company’s	
cybersecurity	budget.	25	As	a	point	of	comparison,	there	is	also	a	series	of	sector-specific	studies	conducted	by	Frost	and	
Sullivan,	which	are	addressed	separately	because	the	specific	metric	studied	was	“network	security,”	which	is	arguably	
distinct	from	overall	“cybersecurity,”	and	because	the	results	are	notably	outside	the	range	found	by	the	remainder	of	the	
studies.	This	series	of	studies	found	in	“Healthcare,”	“Banking/Financial/Insurance,”	and	“Manufacturing,”	the	average	
percent	of	IT	Budget	devoted	to	“network	security”	was	16%,	whereas	for	“Government”	it	was	19%,	and	for	“Retail”	it	
was	15%.	Considering	the	substantial	departure	from	other	studies,	the	variability	in	terminology,	and	the	unavailability	of	
detailed	methods,	this	study	is	not	included	with	the	other	studies,	but	given	the	usage	of	spending	as	a	percentage	of	
Total	IT	Budget,	(a	relative	rarity),	and	the	strong	reputation	of	the	group	conducting	the	study,	it	is	included	for	
completeness.	See,	e.g.,	“The	Future	of	IT	in	the	Manufacturing	Industry”,	F&S.	2014.	[Online].	Available:	
http://cds.frost.com/p/71559/#!/ppt/c?id=M9D2-01-00-00-00.	Accessed	on;	Jun.	10,	2016.	26	Although	additional	factors	
are	often	speculated	to	have	an	impact	upon	cybersecurity	budgets,	such	as	maturity	and	geographic	region,	the	data	as	
yet	is	insufficient	to	make	any	definitive	statements.		
studies,	there	nonetheless	exists	a	consistent	negative	association	between	organizational	size	and	
spending	as	a	percentage	of	IT	budget.	We	believe	this	is	a	logical	consequence	of	larger	organizations	
enjoying	economies	of	scale.	This	trend	suggests	certain	baseline	costs	for	a	cybersecurity	program	
that	organizations	incur	regardless	of	their	size,	after	which	the	program	costs	grow	more	slowly	than	
the	IT	budget.		
	
4.3	Sector		
Similarly,	our	research	suggests	that	an	organization’s	sector	has	a	substantial	impact	on	cybersecurity	
budgets.	Each	of	the	non-excluded	studies	that	differentiated	by	sector	identified	notable	spending	
variations	between	those	sectors.	Despite,	again,	a	lack	of	uniformity	in	delineating	sectors,	certain	
trends	are	nonetheless	identifiable	from	the	data	presented.	“Finance”	and	“Aerospace	and	Defense,”	
both	of	which	are	consistently	differentiated,	are	also	consistently	identified	as	employing	higher	than	
average	cybersecurity	spending,	whereas	“Retail,”	another	recurrent	category,	was	consistently	lower	
than	the	overall	average.	The	lack	of	more	consistent	delineation	between	sectors	makes	any	further	
conclusions	difficult,	although	emerging	trends	may	be	speculated	based	upon	individual	studies	and	
sector-specific	cyber-risk.		
	
4.4	Limitations		
Notwithstanding	these	trends,	our	analysis	of	the	study	of	cybersecurity	budgets	as	a	whole	found	
several	foundational	problems	that	made	drawing	any	strong	conclusions	from	the	available	research	
difficult.	Indeed	the	exclusion	criteria	we	applied	left	few	studies	remaining,	and	even	among	the	best	
designed	of	these	remaining	studies,	elements	of	their	methodology	and	results	cast	doubts	as	to	
their	overall	utility.		
	
4.4.1	Missing	Baseline	Data		
The	most	recurrent	problem,	highlighted	in	Section	2.1,	was	that	studies	frequently	looked	exclusively	
at	relative	changes	in	cybersecurity	spending,	without	any	baseline	for	comparison.	Surveys	asking	
whether	cybersecurity	spending	is	“increasing,	decreasing,	or	remaining	the	same,”	litter	the	
headlines,	and	yet	provide	little	actionable	information,	particularly	to	an	organization	first	
attempting	to	budget	cybersecurity.	Without	some	knowledge	of	what	the	individual	budgets	are	
shifting	from,	this	information	amounts	to	answering	the	question	“How	much	should	I	spend	on	
cybersecurity?”	with	“More!”	While	some	of	the	non-excluded	studies	began	to	address	this	concern	
by	providing	more	complete	data,27	this	proved	to	be	the	exception,	and	not	the	rule.		
	
4.4.2	Survey	Methodology	and	Rigor		
Even	among	the	studies	that	were	not	excluded,	the	overarching	reliance	on	survey	data	inserts	a	
great	deal	of	uncertainty	as	to	the	accuracy	of	the	responses	the	data	is	based	upon.	Considering	the	
variability	in	the	individual	respondents’	positions	within	the	surveyed	companies,	the	generally	low	
response	rates,	and	the	prevalence	of	“unsure”	answers,	it	is	difficult	to	say	whether	the	information	
about	budgets	reflects	what	budgets	are,	or	what	individuals	guess	the	budgets	are.	Coupled	with	this	
is	the	recurrent	failure	to	clearly	and	consistently	define	what	constitutes	“cybersecurity,”	both	from	
the	variability	in	terminology	(e.g.,	information	security	vs.	cybersecurity),	as	well	as	the	frequent	
overlaps	between	cybersecurity	and	other	budgetary	areas.28	Indeed	even	the	delineation	of	“IT	
budget”	may	vary	between		
	
27	See,	[SANS]	supra.	28	This	may	include	overlaps	with	identity	management,	physical	security,	code	hygiene	and	coding	
best	practices,		
	
sectors,	potentially	undermining	this	as	a	point	of	comparison.	Even	assuming	consistency,	the	
exclusive	reliance	upon	survey	data	raises	the	spectre	of	bias,	whether	through	non-response,	
non-representative	samples,	or	social	desirability.	While	these	variations	may	normalize	in	the	
aggregate,	they	nonetheless	insert	uncertainty	into	the	cybersecurity	budget	analysis.		
	
4.4.3	Hidden	Variables		
Moreover,	cybersecurity	budgets	are	influenced	by	a	number	of	factors,	many	of	which	were	
unstudied	or	unidentified	in	our	sample,	that	can	greatly	alter	how	an	individual	organization	
interprets	the	data.	Although	the	influence	of	sector	and	size	are	well	established,	and	frequently	
differentiated,	other	factors,	such	as	the	maturity	of	the	cybersecurity	program	or	the	geographic	
region	of	the	organization,	are	rarely	studied	in	any	meaningful	way.	For	example,	although	
programmatic	maturity	is	frequently	discussed	as	a	potential	confounding	factor,	(more	mature	
cybersecurity	programs	could	logically	operate	more	efficiently),	the	direct	impact	of	cybersecurity	
program	maturity	was	only	directly	identified	in	one	study.	Wisegate	found	that	more	mature	
programs	tended	to	have	higher	budgets.29	Whether	this	is	indicative	of	a	larger	trend	is	unclear,	as	
companies	with	more	mature	cybersecurity	programs	may	also	fit	into	demographic	groups	that	are	
associated	with	higher	spending,	such	as	the	finance	sector.	Nevertheless,	the	debate	surrounding	
cybersecurity	maturity	highlights	the	importance	of	gathering	and	analyzing	as	many	factors	as	
possible,	as	consideration	of	these	additional	factors	can	greatly	alter	individual	organizations’	
budgetary	analyses.		
	
4.4.4	Intra-study	Variability		
However,	the	single	most	troubling	caveat	to	the	available	data	is	the	massive	intra-study	variability	
reflected	in	the	data,	even	when	taking	into	account	sector	and	size.	PWC	found	that	3.92%	of	“large	
businesses”	(total	revenues	exceeding	$1	billion)	selected	the	lowest	bracket	of	spending	for	
information	security,	$49,000	or	less,	while	1.1%	of	small	businesses	(total	revenues	less	than	$100	
million)	selected	the	highest	bracket	of	spending	for	information	security,	at	$10	million	or	more.30	
Similar	variability	was	found	in	all	studies	which	provided	granular	data,	with	Dell	finding	that	7%	of	
companies	spent	over	30%	of	IT	Budget	on	IT	Security;31	and	E&Y	finding	that	among	businesses	with	
revenues	over	$10	billion,	between	18%	and	29%	spend	less	than	$1	million	on	information	security,	
including	24%	of	businesses	with	total	revenues	between	$25	and	$50	billion.32	While	these	outliers	
may	simply	reflect	inaccurate	responses,	all	organization	sizes	and	sectors	appear	to	be	represented	in	
all	budgetary	brackets	to	some	degree	in	each	survey,	suggesting	either	a	massive	degree	of	actual	
variability	in	spending,	or	a	fundamental	unreliability	in	the	data	presented.33	Such	vast	variability	
makes	it	very	difficult	to	abstract	a	meaningful	normative	baseline	or	average	spending.		
	
	
	
and	the	usage	of	third	party	cloud	storage	and	services.	29	See,	[Wisegate]	supra.	Therefore	the	study	found	the	opposite	
of	the	presumed	effect.	Although	the	reasons	for	this	are	unknown,	and	could	be	many,	the	most	logical	would	seem	to	be	
that	subsets	of	an	organization	are	unlikely	to	voluntarily	reduce	their	own	budget.	30	See,	[PWC]	supra.	31	See,	[Dell]	
supra.	32	See,	[EY]	supra.	33	This	is	taking	into	account	responses	that	amount	to	“unsure”	or	“don’t	know.”		
	
5	Recommendations		
5.1	Recommendations	for	Organizations		
Avoid	over-reliance	on	benchmarking	data	generally.	The	variability	in	studies	we	reviewed	(in	terms	
of	rigor,	methodologies,	sample	size	and	bias,	and	results)	strongly	suggests	that	most	benchmarking	
studies	are	of	limited	validity	in	describing	the	state	of	budgetary	reality.	There	is	even	less	reason	to	
believe	these	studies	represent	what	organizations	should	spend.	Cybersecurity	budgeting	is	a	
complex	organizational	activity.	Organizations	are	well-advised	to	think	carefully	about	their	
budgetary	processes	for	cybersecurity34	and	how	cyber	risk	intersects	with	organizational	mission,	
rather	than	over-focus	of	the	final	numbers	or	percentages.		
	
Talk	to	peer	organizations	and	seek	out	relevant	case	studies,	or	survey	studies	that	differentiate	the	
data	based	upon,	at	a	minimum,	sector	and	size.	Considering	the	importance	of	sector	and	size,	as	
well	as	the	variability	in	cybersecurity	spending	generally,	organizations	should	look	for	the	data	sets	
that	represent	the	most	similarly	situated	organizations	to	their	own.	While	inclusion	of	additional	
criteria	is	preferred,	sector	and	size	should	be	considered	mandatory	for	a	meaningful	benchmarking.	
Organizations	should	prefer	studies	that	provide	access	to	all	of	the	data,	so	that	organizations	can	
visualize	the	spectrum	of	spending	practices	among	their	peers.	At	a	minimum	should	include	access	
to	averages	among	organizations	of	their	size	within	their	sector.		
Ignore	all	but	the	highest-quality	benchmarking	studies.	We	believe	PWC35	and	EY	provide	the	most	
actionable	data,	in	large	part	due	to	their	release	of	data	exploration	tools	to	visualize	and	filter	their	
data,	whereas	SANS	and	Wisegate	should	also	be	considered	for	broader	insight	into	security	trends	
generally.	These	studies	are	highlighted	in	particular	because	of	their	attempts	to	quantify	important	
trends,	their	representations	of	the	nuances	of	their	datasets,	and	their	insights	into	the	underlying	
data.		
	
5.2	Recommendations	for	Future	Studies		
Establish	clear	methodology,	internally	consistent	definitions,	and	rigorous	standards	for	the	data	
collected.		
	
Provide	more	granular	access	to	the	underlying	data.	Considering	the	importance	of	certain	factors	on	
spending,	mere	access	to	a	global	average	is	often	misleading,	and	of	little	direct	worth	to	an	
organization	wishing	to	benchmark.	By	providing	more	granular	access	to	the	data,	organizations	will	
be	better	empowered	to	select	the	sample	set	that	aligns	with	their	own	requirements.		
	
Provide	greater	detail	into	how	security	budgets	are	allocated.	Although	generalized	benchmarking	
studies	are	useful	for	high	level	decision-making,	often	organizations	will	be	interested	in	specifically	
how	much	should	be	spent	for	particular	security	functions.	For	instance,	how	much	do	organizations	
spend	on	security	personnel	vs.	technological	“solutions”	vs.	outsourced	services?		
	
Increase	methodological	rigor	and	employ	an	increasing	variety	of	research	methods.	Almost	the	
polar		
	
34	See,	Moore	et	al.,	“Identifying	How	Firms	Manage	Cybersecurity	Investment”,	2016.	[Online].	Available:	
http://weis2016.econinfosec.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/05/WEIS_2016_paper_19-1.pdf.	Accessed	on:	Jun.	10,	
2016.	35	PWC	has	since	released	a	subsequent	“State	of	Information	Security	2016,”	which	no	longer	provides	spending	
averages	as	a	percentage	of	IT	budget,	instead	providing	only	a	data	exploration	tool	in	dollars.		
	
	
opposite	of	survey	research,	detailed	case	studies	can	provide	powerful	insights	into	complex	
organizational	processes.	This	is	particularly	important	in	evolving,	high	variability	domains.		
	
Collect	more	data	on	potentially	relevant	factors	(e.g.,	program	maturity,	presence	of	regulated	data	
or	systems)	to	determine	whether	and	to	what	degree	they	relate	to	cybersecurity	spending.	Although	
our	research	has	identified	a	select	few	factors	which	have	a	notable	impact,	it	is	clear	that	“more	
research	is	needed.”	Multifactor	analysis	is	critical	to	making	this	research	meaningful.		
	
Quantify	the	impact	of	variable	cybersecurity	budgets	on	security	outcomes,	such	as	data	breaches	or	
network	intrusions.	An	overarching	shortcoming	of	the	available	data	is	that	it	represents	solely	what	
others	are	doing,	not	whether	what	they	are	doing	is	working.	The	identification	of	and	assessment	of	
cybersecurity	metrics	is	highly	important	moving	forward,	as	information	on	the	security	practices	of	
others	is	of	little	worth	when	their	security	is	inadequate.		
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Abstract 
 
The Science DMZ architecture1 proposes a novel method of design for network segments optimized 
for large-scale data transfer (LSDT) functionality. LSDT has special requirements, both in the 
security and functional arenas. Attempts to incorporate LSDT functionality into a more traditional 
perimeter security model can cause problems both with LSDT functionality, as well as weaken 
overall campus security. The Science DMZ attempts to solve this problem by segmenting the LSDT 
function away from the traditional campus security perimeter. However, insufficient attention has 
been paid thus far as to how the Science DMZ fits into a larger strategy of risk-based segmentation 
and functional maximization of campus networks. This paper examines typical risk- and 
control-based security approaches and proposes a framework in which the Science DMZ, combined 
with a larger segmentation approach, actually improves the security of valuable campus information 
assets, while still maximizing LSDT function and security. It concludes with some examples as to 
how the security of the research enterprise can be vastly improved with a Science DMZ deployment 
that is carefully aligned with a segmentation strategy.  
 
Introduction  
 
The Science DMZ design is rapidly gaining traction in the Research and Education community. 
Many educational and research institutions, from the US Department of Energy’s National Energy 
Research Supercomputer Center (NERSC) to large Carnegie R1 universities, to much smaller 
colleges and research institutes, are all deploying some variant of the Science DMZ model.2 The 
National Science Foundation has given numerous financial awards to educational institutions 
deploying the Science DMZ.3 Entire confederations of Science DMZs and Data Transfer Nodes 
(DTNs), such as the Pacific Research Platform and proposed Atlantic Research Platform, are being 
established.4 Science DMZs are quickly becoming an integral part of a campus network 
infrastructure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 E. Dart, L. Rotman, B. Tierney, M. Hester and J. Zurawski, "The Science DMZ: A network design pattern for 
data-intensive science," 2 013 SC ­ International Conference for High Performance Computing, Networking, Storage 
and Analysis (SC), Denver, CO, 2013, pp. 1-10. doi: 10.1145/2503210.2503245 2 For the prototypical Science DMZ 
model, see http://fasterdata.es.net/science-dmz/. 3 h ttps://www.nsf.gov/funding/pgm_summ.jsp?pims_id=504748 
contains descriptions of the various CC* grants that have been awarded by the NSF, as well as links to individual award 
abstracts and maps of awardees. See also Kevin Thompson’s summary in h 
ttp://www.thequilt.net/wp-content/uploads/KThompson_Quilt_Feb2016.pdf.  4 On the Pacific Research Platform (PRP), 
see http://prp.ucsd.edu/. Both the PRP and the proposed Atlantic Research Platform are described in the 2016 issue of 
the Quilt Circle. See https://issuu.com/noahredman1/docs/the2016quiltcircle, especiallypp.2,7. 
Onpage7,theproposedAtlantic Research Platform is described as “Network-wide Science DMZ.”  
  
Still, there is much concern about how best to secure the Science DMZ. While the Science DMZ 
attempts to provide a bona-fide security model for LSDT, it suffers from its incompatibility with 
control-based security strategies that specifically posit the use of stateful perimeter-based control 
mechanisms such as commercial firewalls. The Science DMZ explicitly eschews these mechanisms 
for performance reasons, which has led to the misperception that the Science DMZ is principally 
concerned with “avoiding firewalls.” Although the Science DMZ attempts to minimize risk by 
bypassing stateful firewalls, it is fully compatible with a default-deny security policy enforced by 
stateless5 means, such as line-rate router ACLs.6 Nevertheless, the question remains, “how to secure 
a Science DMZ?”  
 
Control-based vs. Risk-based Security  
 
I argue that questions that specifically ask how to secure a Science DMZ stem from a control­based 
view of security. Control-based security starts with a set of controls which are assumed (but 
generally not verified) to improve the security of a set of valuable assets and reduce risk, both to 
said assets and the institution managing them. Control-based security strategies tend to focus on 
technology and on top-down security policies and checklists. Security and risk are audited by 
examining the presence of certain key controls, without actually verifying that they are reducing 
risk commensurate with their total cost, including the costs of potentially reduced functionality for 
the assets being protected by the controls.  
The advantage of control-based security is that it is labor-saving over other types of security. 
Having a ready set of controls that are assumed to provide security yields a short-cut that allows 
minimal security and risk-assessment staff to still provide potentially substantial security benefits to 
a large set of campus resources. In particular, a large, stateful perimeter firewall, while expensive in 
terms of capital costs, can provide benefits to large portions of a campus with minimal managerial 
overhead.  
The disadvantage of control-based security is that it lends itself to a one-size-fits-all security policy, 
which ignores the wide diversity of information assets, and concomitant risk profiles, present on 
modern university or research lab campus. While it potentially saves money in the near term, it 
ultimately reduces efficiency: Controls are applied to resources whether or not the controls reduce 
risk, and more controls are assumed to provide more security, even if this is not actually the case. 
Although campuses have been moving more toward control-based security in recent years, it 
appears that data-exfiltration breaches, to cite one possible measure of security, have been steady, 
or possibly on the rise.7  
 
 
 
 
5 A discussion of stateful vs. stateless firewalls can be found in NIST publication 800-41, section 2.1. 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-41-Rev1/sp800-41-rev1.pdf 6 The “avoiding firewall” misperception also 
obscures other critical features of the Science DMZ, such as the use of high-queue-depth network interfaces for WAN 
connections, placement of the Science DMZ close to the campus border to reduce within-campus points of failure and 
degradation, and ongoing performance and security monitoring through technologies like perfSONAR and Bro. While 
this paper is mainly concerned with the security f eatures of the Science DMZ, it is drawn from the inspiration that an 
excessive focus on avoiding firewalls can lead to suboptimal Science DMZ deployments, if the firewall issue crowds 
out other important features. 7 I discuss this in a currently-unpublished presentation titled “What’s wrong with 
information security in higher education?” given at the Research and Education track at the North American Network 
Operators’ Group, NANOG 60, Atlanta, GA, February 2014. My own experience with my former institution, UC 
Berkeley, and other UC  
Control-based strategies can be contrasted with risk-based strategies. While control-based strategies 
attempt to short-circuit careful risk assessment, a risk-based strategy makes risk assessment the 
foundation of the security enterprise. Assets and resources are first assessed for their risk to both the 
asset itself and to the host institution, and then only once the risk assessment is complete, security 
controls are devised to carefully match and mitigate the identified risks.  
Risk-based strategies have the disadvantage of being more labor-intensive, as risk assessments must 
be completed and then custom security strategies tailored to the set of identified risks. However, 
they can also be more efficient and more secure, as they reduce the incidence of ineffective controls 
being applied. Risk-based strategies may also be delegated to the owners of the resources, rather 
than applied solely by the campus security team. As long as proper accountability is in place and is 
well-understood, such delegation empowers campus IT administrators, spreads the responsibility 
for security, and fosters a “security culture,” which can be far more effective than simple 
control-based security.  
 
It is also possible to have a hybrid approach, where:  
 
1. Risk profiles are developed for a set of resources or assets.   
2. “Standard controls” are proposed, which match the risk profile.   
3. “Compensating controls” are allowed through an exception process. Compensating controls 
 mitigate the risk more effectively than the proposed standard control, and/or they preserve 
critical functional requirements better than the standard control.   
 
In the hybrid model, steps 1 and 2 can be performed by the security team, while step 3 can be 
proposed by the resource owner, thereby spreading responsibility. The resource owner can decide 
whether to accept the standard control or propose a compensating control.  
 
Segmentation and the Science DMZ  
 
It is pretty obvious that even a mid-sized campus network will tend to interconnect sets of 
information resources with vastly different risk profiles. If students are housed on campus, public 
and even most private institutions will tend to view themselves as an ISP to their 
students--providing them basic Internet services in their homes. As such, students will tend to 
demand privacy and the same amount of freedom that they would expect from a home cable or DSL 
provider. In such a situation, risks to the institution may actually i ncrease if excessive security 
controls are applied to student networks. Contrast this with, for example, a campus’s main HR 
system, and it stands to reason that information-security risk varies widely, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively.  
It should therefore come as no surprise that the phrase “one size fits all” is frequently used 
pejoratively in IT. Attempting to place the same set of controls on vastly different information 
resources can be both perilous and costly, at least in the long term. Unfortunately, this is part of the 
problem with control-based  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
campuses that implement a variety of control-based mechanisms, indicates that data breaches have increased, even as 
controls have increased. More research is likely needed to provide more accurate metrics.  
  
security, which, in its purest (and probably rarely extant) form, does not take risk into account, and 
therefore, cannot identify assets with different risk profiles.  
 
The way risk-based security approaches deal with the vastly different risk profiles is to first identify 
them, and second, to attempt to segment the resources according to their risk profile. In the context 
of network-attached information resources, segmenting can be done at layer 1 (e.g. air-gaps or 
separate WDM lambdas for different risk-based networks) or layer 2 (e.g. separate VLANs). This is 
precisely where the Science DMZ comes in. Because the Science DMZ model prescribes 
segmentation to meet performance, troubleshooting, and security needs, it fits in nicely with a 
larger risk-based segmentation strategy. The Science DMZ can be viewed as the “LSDT segment” 
of a larger risk-based security-segmentation program.  
 
Maintaining Reasonable Scope  
 
For campuses deploying the Science DMZ who also use largely control-based approaches to 
security, a Science DMZ deployment can seem daunting. CISOs will want to sign off on the design 
and they may not like what they see as “missing controls.” But it may seem even more daunting to 
try to use a Science DMZ deployment to change the way that the campus views security--in effect, 
a forcing-function pushing the campus from a largely control-based approach to a risk-based 
approach, just so some scientists can do data transfers! Even hybrid approaches will want to pay 
close attention to compensating controls.  
 
It should not be a prerequisite that a major university’s entire security strategy shift significantly 
just so a Science DMZ can be deployed. The good news is that the Science DMZ is only 
incompatible with control-based security in its purest form, and rarely do campuses actually 
practice such methods in their extreme. Because most campuses are capable of at least some level 
of risk-assessment, it is therefore important that the Science DMZ maintain a carefully-scoped risk 
profile, to ease the risk-assessment process. The resources located within the Science DMZ segment 
should only be geared toward maximizing the functionality and security of the LSDT function. 
Placing other information resources in the Science DMZ, such as email servers serving mailing lists, 
informational web servers that are not used for data transfers, etc., changes the risk profile and 
complicates security efforts. In order to maintain good segmentation by risk, the Science DMZ must 
remain narrow in scope.  
 
Using the Science DMZ to Secure Research  
 
The benefit of the Science DMZ is that, not only does it provide a method of balancing security and 
functionality for LSDT, but it does provide a way of securing other parts of the campus network. 
Consider the following example:  
 
Research instruments are often managed by computers, and these computers run specialized 
software, albeit often on commodity hardware and using off-the-shelf operating systems. This often 
presents a “worst-of-both-worlds” security and risk profile: The custom software is rarely updated, 
patched, or even audited for security flaws, and the commodity operating system has known and 
commonly-exploited  
  
 
vulnerabilities, but cannot be upgraded to a more secure version because of dependencies relating to 
the custom software.  
 
This catch-22 gets worse when one considers that the custom system is often responsible for 
extracting raw data from the instrument. If that data has to be made available to collaborators or the 
public, the possibility of placing a dangerously insecure system on the public network now arises. 
This is the sort of headache that security officers often have to deal with, and the “solution” is often 
to throw a lot of controls at the system, and place heavy restrictions on it using stateful firewalls.  
 
This raises two issues:  
1. The controls may make the performance of the system so bad that data cannot be extracted at a 
reasonable rate.   
2. Even so, the controls m ay not be effective, since wider access to at least certain resources on the 
system necessary to extract data may still expose vulnerabilities.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Pre­Science DMZ: I n this figure, the scientific instrument is on the far right, and its 
(potentially vulnerable) control system is connected to it, and to the main campus network, so that 
data from the instrument can be shared. The campus network must allow at least some access to the 
control system so that data-sharing requirements can be met. This raises security issues.  
 
In this case, a Science DMZ solves both issues in an elegant and effective way. Rather than develop 
a one-off bastion host to access the data, a standard, supported, and scalable Science DMZ can 
support this particular research instrument, and possibly many other similarly-configured 
instruments. The Science DMZ can allow the instrument to be heavily walled-off from the rest of 
the world, and can only be  
  
accessed by one or more data transfer nodes within the Science DMZ. For even more security, the 
instrument may be fully air-gapped on the network side, and the data may be transferred using a 
separate SAN system. In this model, the system driving the instrument mounts a LUN via 
fibre-channel and then unmounts it after the data is transferred. A DTN then mounts the LUN and 
transfers the data to outside collaborators. This is a somewhat stylized example, but it can be proven 
to work, and can provide a great deal of performance and security. Moreover, this model of 
segmentation that includes a Science DMZ, actually reduces risk and vulnerability, rather than 
adding risk. 
 
 
  
Figure 2: Post­Science DMZ: I n this scenario, a Science DMZ has been installed in the upper 
right, with a SAN-connected DTN (the grey boxes) and an optical tap and monitoring system (red 
computer). The control system is now disconnected from the main campus network and only 
mounts a LUN on the SAN in order to save data collected from the instrument. Once the data is 
saved, the DTN inside the Science DMZ mounts the LUN and allows the data to be exported over a 
high-performance WAN. The control system is protected, but data-sharing needs are still met.  
 
Conclusion: The Science DMZ and the Flywheel Effect  
 
Even where campuses practice a largely control-based security method, the example above shows 
how overall security can be improved for applications where data from research instruments must 
be shared over the network. As this is quickly becoming the norm in R & E, this kind of application 
is likely to exist on many campuses. Making use of the Science DMZ to provide high-performance 
data transfer capabilities, while carefully segmenting and managing risk, can actually allow for 
other parts of the campus network to be made m ore secure. By demonstrating success with 
risk-based segmentation, the Science DMZ can promote more instances of risk-based approaches to 
security. This can create a flywheel effect, where campuses eventually improve their posture at 
assessing and managing risk, and in the process, develop better methods and strategies that 
ultimately improve their overall security standing.  
  
Security officers need to be made aware of the trade-offs inherent in various security architectures. 
In the case of the Science DMZ, security officers’ concerns can be allayed by analyzing and 
documenting the risks that accrue to the Science DMZ itself, proposing and implementing 
compensating controls, and in demonstrating how the Science DMZ can substantially improve 
security on other parts of the campus network, as in the case above. As noted, controls on the 
Science DMZ itself are still necessary, but such controls can be demonstrated to match and mitigate 
the specific risks of the Science DMZ, when it is segmented away from the rest of the campus 
network.8 By including these carefully-developed controls and firmly situating the Science DMZ 
architecture in a larger strategy of risk-based network security, campus information security can be 
substantially improved.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Work is already being done on identifying sets of controls that are applicable to the Science DMZ’s risk profile. See, 
for example, the work of Nick Buraglio and others, e.g. “Best Practices for Securing the Science DMZ, BroCon, 2014 
(h ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IPh3aZ18IuY ) and “Securing the Science DMZ,” Focused Technical Workshop, 
July 2014 (http://meetings.internet2.edu/media/medialibrary/2014/07/14/20140716-buraglio-sciencedmzsec.pdf).  
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Abstract  
Globus Auth is a foundational identity and access 
management platform service designed to address 
unique needs of the science and engineering 
community. It serves to broker authentication and 
authorization interactions between end-users, 
identity providers, resource servers (services), and 
clients (including web, mobile, and desktop 
applications, and other services). Globus Auth 
thus makes it easy, for example, for a researcher 
to authenticate with one credential, connect to a 
specific remote storage resource with another 
identity, and share data with colleagues based on 
their global identity. By eliminating friction 
associated with the frequent need for multiple 
accounts, identities, credentials, and groups when 
using distributed cyberinfrastructure, Globus Auth 
streamlines the creation, integration, and use of 
advanced research services. Here we introduce 
Globus Auth by describing how it can be used by 
a real research service, the Research Data Archive 
of the National Center for Atmospheric Research, 
to enhance both delivered capabilities and user 
experience.  
1. Introduction  
Progress in science and engineering is hindered by 
a pervasive lack of high-quality, easy-to-use 
applications and services. Small businesses have 
seen a transformational change in how 
information technology (IT) is delivered and used, 
slashing costs and increasing capabilities by 
outsourcing a wide range of business IT functions 
to software-as-a-service business service 
providers [9]. In principle, the data- and compute- 
intensive work of research laboratories could be 
similarly transformed, if various routine but 
resource-intensive operations (e.g., data 
management) could be outsourced to suitable 
research service providers. But in practice this 
transformation has not occurred.  
Part of the problem is that research is a classic 
long tail market: different scientific communities, 
sub- communities, laboratories, and even 
individual researchers often have idiosyncratic 
information technology needs. But it is also the 
case that a lack of common infrastructure services 
makes it challenging to  
develop new services, by introducing unnecessary 
identity and integration friction, as we now 
explain.  
The developer of a new research service faces two 
major infrastructure challenges, namely (1) 
providing sophisticated identity and access 
management (IAM) functionality; and (2) 
integrating with multiple other services, that have 
been developed by independent parties, while 
providing a good user experience.  
Addressing these challenges has been far too 
difficult for the vast majority of service providers. 
The result is a fragmented ecosystem of research 
services. For example, few scientific web 
applications and science gateways leverage 
federated identity systems such as InCommon [7]. 
Instead, each service provider cobbles together its 
own identity management solution. The result, all 
too often, is applications with limited 
functionality (due to the cost and expertise 
required to implement sophisticated IAM 
functionality), little integration (due to the 
difficulty in integrating different IAM 
approaches), increased cost to create and maintain 
(due to each group creating their own partial 
solutions), and poor user experience (due to 
inconsistent and incompatible IAM functionality)  
Globus Auth [2] is platform as a service (PaaS) 
that addresses these challenges, with the goal of 
streamlining the creation, integration, and use of 
advanced research services [6]. In brief, it allows 
research service providers to outsource identity, 
credential, profile, and group management 
functions to a cloud-hosted, professionally 
managed service. In so doing, providers gain four 
major benefits. First, they gain access to 
sophisticated IAM functionality that would be 
difficult for them to implement from scratch 
themselves. Second, they gain integration with 
other systems, based on standards such as OAuth2, 
OpenID Connect, SAML, and X.509. Third, they 
reduce implementation and operation costs: 
complex in-house code can be replaced with 
simple REST API calls to a professionally 
operated service. And fourth, they improve user 
experience by delivering high-quality, 
consistently presented IAM capabilities and 
interfaces.  
In the rest of this article, we use a real-world 
example to illustrate how these benefits can be 
obtained in practice.  
 
2. NCAR’S Research Data Archive  
The National Center for Atmospheric Research 
(NCAR) maintains the Web-based Research Data 
Archive (RDA) [1], which contains more than 600 
data collections. These collections, which range in 
size from gigabytes to tens of terabytes, include 
meteorological and oceanographic observations, 
operational and reanalysis model outputs, and 
remote sensing datasets to support atmospheric 
and geosciences research, along with ancillary 
datasets, such as topography/bathymetry, 
vegetation, and land use datasets. RDA users are 
primarily researchers at federal and academic 
research laboratories. In 2014 alone, more than 
11,000 people downloaded more than 1.1 
petabytes. Until recently, all downloads were over 
HTTP, either via Web browser, or via scripts that 
use wget or cURL.  
HTTP downloads are known to be inefficient and 
unreliable over wide area, high speed networks. 
Use of scripts can mitigate these issues somewhat, 
but at the cost of increased complexity for users. 
In order to keep up with user demand for data and 
to provide its users with an easy to use, reliable, 
high performance delivery service, NCAR 
recently added the ability to download data via the 
Globus cloud-hosted data transfer service [4].  
Globus provides simple web interfaces for setting 
up and monitoring downloads, and implements 
the downloads themselves by specialized software 
and protocols that usually outperform HTTP and 
that can continue a download even if the system 
being downloaded to (or from) is temporarily 
turned off or temporarily loses its network 
connection. The Globus transfer service thus 
ensure that downloads complete, regardless of 
how many times they are interrupted along the 
way [5]. 
 
Figure 1: Example data access matrix from a 
dataset page on the RDA website. Selecting the 
highlighted link initiates a Globus data share for 
the dataset.  
When NCAR added Globus data services to RDA, 
they leveraged several Globus features to 
integrate the RDA and Globus user experiences. 
When an RDA user is ready to download a batch 
of data from the RDA website, one of the options 
available via the website is, “Request a Globus 
Invitation” (see Figure 1). If the user selects that 
option, the RDA system automatically creates a 
folder on a Globus “shared endpoint” that 
contains the requested data, and uses Globus to 
invite the user to access this shared endpoint 
folder via the user’s email address [8]. An email 
message is sent to the user with a link to the 
shared endpoint. By clicking on this link, the user 
can login to Globus, connect to the shared 
endpoint, and transfer the data wherever they need 
it: either to their  
local system or to another national system, for 
example to perform further analysis on the data 
[8].  
While the integration of RDA with Globus is 
quickly gaining popularity, it is unfortunately not 
as seamless as one would like. Its users must 
currently create a Globus identity (username and 
password) to access the data, instead of simply 
using the user’s existing RDA identity. For the 
user to have single sign-on to both RDA and 
Globus, the user must link their RDA identity to 
their Globus identity (see Figure 2). The need to 
perform these tasks degrades the user experience 
and increases the complexity of the RDA-Globus 
integration.  
In the following, we describe how RDA is using 
the new Globus Auth service to streamline its 
current integration with Globus capabilities—and 
also to add powerful new capabilities to RDA.  
Figure 2: Globus support for NCAR RDA as an 
identity provider (highlighted) means that users can 
use their RDA identity to authenticate to Globus 
services.  
3. Improving RDA With Globus Auth  
RDA can use Globus Auth to overcome identity 
and integration friction associated with its current 
implementation of IAM and Globus transfer 
capabilities, and thus to address the challenges 
described in the introduction. We use five 
examples to illustrate the opportunities.  
3.1 Remove the Need for a Globus Identity  
Globus Auth allows a Globus account to be 
created using any identity. Users no longer need 
to create a Globus username and password. 
Instead, since RDA is a Globus Auth-supported 
identity provider, Globus accounts can be created 
using any RDA identity. Since the Globus data 
transfer service uses Globus accounts provided by 
Globus Auth, an RDA user can then login to both 
RDA and the Globus transfer service using their 
RDA identity.  
Globus Auth gives identity providers two options 
for such integration. First, it allows for identity 
provisioning by supported identity managers, via 
its REST API. RDA can use the Globus Auth 
REST API to proactively provision all RDA 
identities with Globus Auth. Second and 
alternatively, OpenID Connect [12] and SAML 
[11] identity providers (via CILogon) can 
configure Globus Auth to dynamically provision 
an identity with Globus Auth the first time it is 
used to login to Globus Auth.  
Note that Globus Auth uses web-based federated 
identity protocols, such as OpenID Connect and 
SAML, to perform user login via its supported 
identity providers, so that Globus Auth is never 
required to see user passwords.  
Depending on the configuration of a specific 
identity provider with Globus Auth, creation of a 
Globus account at first login with an identity can 
be made completely automatic. Alternatively, 
Globus Auth may prompt the user for additional 
Globus account information (e.g., email address, 
display name, and/or acceptance of Globus terms 
and conditions).  
If an RDA user already has a Globus account 
using a different identity, Globus Auth makes it 
easy to link their RDA identity to this existing 
Globus account, rather than creating a new 
Globus account.  
Globus Auth makes it easy for RDA to give its 
users single sign-on to RDA, as well as to other 
services that use Globus Auth, such as Globus 
data transfer.  
3.2 IntegrateRDAandGlobusTransferAPI  
RDA does not currently use the Globus data 
transfer REST API to manage transfers. Instead, 
RDA sets up a Globus shared endpoint with the 
appropriate data, and then directs the user to the 
Globus web application to transfer the data. The 
previous section describes how Globus Auth can 
enhance that experience by allowing web single 
sign-on to both RDA and Globus using the 
Globus identity.  
However, Globus Auth allows RDA to go a step 
further, to integrate RDA directly with the Globus 
transfer service via the Globus transfer REST API. 
Thus, for example, the RDA web application 
could directly ask the user where (which Globus 
endpoint and path) they want their data sent. RDA 
would then act on the user’s behalf to direct 
Globus to perform the transfer. So rather than the 
user leaving the RDA web application to perform 
transfers via Globus, RDA instead keeps the user 
in the RDA web application, and directs the 
Globus transfers behind the scenes on behalf of 
the user.  
The mechanisms required to achieve this 
integration are straightforward. RDA must 
become an OAuth2 client [10] to Globus Auth. 
Then, when the user requests a transfer via the 
RDA web site, RDA performs a standard OAuth2 
“authorization code grant” with Globus Auth to 
get an OAuth2 access token. RDA then uses this 
access token to request Globus transfers on the 
user’s behalf via the Globus transfer REST API.  
From the user’s perspective, this new process is 
simple. They will be asked the first time this is 
done if they consent to this use of Globus transfer 
by RDA on their behalf. The user will not even be 
required to re-enter their password, assuming the 
RDA identity provider uses the standard web 
single sign-on technique of a session cookie to 
remember the user login. After the first transfer, 
in  
which the user grants consent, all subsequent 
interactions between RDA and Globus will be 
transparent to the user.  
3.3 LeverageOtherGlobus-enabledServices  
Just as RDA integrates with the Globus transfer 
REST API, it could also integrate with other 
services, provided by Globus as well as third 
parties. We give two examples.  
Globus provides a group management service that 
is integrated with Globus Auth and used by 
Globus transfer [6]. RDA could use this service in 
various ways: for example, to authorize access to 
restricted data sets by groups of users.  
XSEDE services [13] such as the XSEDE User 
Portal (XUP) and XSEDE Resource Allocation 
Service (XRAS) will soon support Globus Auth 
access tokens in their REST APIs. Globus Auth 
can thus make integration of RDA with XSEDE 
resources and services as seamless as RDA’s 
integration with Globus data transfer.  
3.4 RemovetheNeedforanRDAIdentity  
RDA currently requires that every user create an 
RDA username and password when they register 
with RDA. However, many RDA users already 
have accounts with federated identity providers, 
such as their universities (via InCommon) and 
Google.  
Globus Auth makes it easy for RDA to add 
support for these federated identity providers. On 
its user registration page, RDA simply needs to 
add an option to create an RDA account to which 
the user can login using any identity provider 
supported by Globus Auth, instead of (or in 
addition to) requiring an RDA password. When 
this option is selected, RDA would simply act as a 
standard OpenID Connect client to Globus Auth. 
During user registration, and subsequently during 
user login, RDA would redirect the user’s browser 
to Globus Auth, the user would login to their 
Globus account using their preferred identity (e.g., 
from their university, Google, etc.), and Globus 
Auth would redirect back to RDA. RDA can then 
get a standard OpenID Connect “id token” from 
Globus Auth that identifies the user.  
Globus Auth takes care of all of the complexities 
of integrating with various identity providers via 
various protocols, linking multiple identities, etc. 
RDA can also get out of the business of managing 
passwords, helping users recover from lost 
passwords, etc., if desired.  
3.5 Integration with RDA REST APIs  
Just as RDA can seamlessly integrate with the 
Globus data transfer service, third party 
application and service developers may want to 
integrate with RDA. However, while RDA 
provides various REST APIs, these APIs currently 
require that the RDA username and password be 
passed with each request.  
Once RDA integrates with Globus Auth in the 
manner described in the previous section, so that 
Globus accounts  
to be used to login to RDA, it is a small step to 
also allow Globus Auth-issued access tokens to be 
used with the RDA REST APIs.  
This approach has two major benefits to RDA. 
First, it allows clients to integrate with RDA as 
seamlessly as RDA integrates with Globus data 
transfer. Second, RDA can easily enhance its 
REST APIs with standard OAuth2 authorization, 
as used by the likes of Facebook, LinkedIn, 
Google, and Microsoft.  
Globus Auth supports the use of a variety of 
authentication methods for acquiring access 
tokens, each suited to different purposes. For 
example: (1) OpenID Connect provides a standard 
Web federated identity protocol that is great for 
web and mobile application clients that want to 
integrate with RDA; (2) Globus Auth supports 
username and password authentication with some 
identity providers, which is useful for legacy 
applications that require username and password 
login; (3) Globus Auth will support X.509 client 
authentication, which is useful for integration 
from legacy grid systems; and (4) forthcoming 
support for app passwords will enable better 
command line application integration with RDA.  
4. Conclusions  
We have used the example of the NCAR Research 
Data Archive to illustrate how Globus Auth can 
be used to streamline the creation, integration, and 
use of advanced research services. In particular, 
we have described how RDA can easily leverage 
Globus Auth to provide enhanced IAM 
capabilities (e.g., authentication with campus 
credentials via InCommon), enhance integration 
with other science services (e.g., Globus transfer, 
XSEDE), and provide new capabilities (e.g., 
OAuth2 support in its REST APIs).  
RDA’s integration with Globus services is new, 
and Globus Auth has just recently become 
available to users. We look forward to working 
with NCAR to realize some of the new 
opportunities laid out in this article.  
We hope it is clear that the methods that we 
presented here can easily be used by other 
research service providers to streamline their own 
services—and that the result will be an overall 
cyberinfrastructure ecosystem that is easier for 
researchers to use and that can more easily be 
applied to specific scientific challenges.  
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